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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays on innovation, productivity, and talent allo-
cation.
The first essay explores a novel channel through which short-term economic
fluctuations affect the long-term innovative output of the economy: innovators'
accumulation of human capital. Using a newly constructed data set on the patent-
ing history of all individuals obtaining a bachelor's degree from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) between 1980 and 2005, I find that cohorts graduat-
ing during booms produce significantly fewer patents over the subsequent two
decades. Initial economic conditions do not affect inventors' long-term occupa-
tional affiliation, suggesting that the main differences lie in their long-term level
of inventive human capital. The decrease in patent output of cohorts graduating
during booms is mainly from inventors with relatively low GPAs, and marginal
patents receive fewer citations than the rest.
The second essay uses the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment to study
the characteristics of recent graduates from MIT bachelor programs who pursued a
career in finance immediately after graduation. I find that finance competes against
science and engineering graduate programs for the best talent from MIT but values
academic skills less. As a result of endogenous skill development during college,
financiers have significantly lower academic skills than students entering gradu-
ate school at graduation, despite having similar levels of raw academic talent mea-
sured at college entrance. Marginal financiers have lower starting salaries than
average financiers, suggesting that there is positive selection into finance.
The third essay examines the asset accumulation and labor force participa-
tion of Social Security Disability Insurance applicants. Using the RAND Health
and Retirement Study panel data, I provide empirical support for the theory that
an imperfectly screened disability insurance program encourages individuals who
dislike work to save more in the present and plan to apply for disability insurance
in the future, regardless of their future health. Despite exhibiting lower labor force
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attachment and earning less than accepted applicants, rejected applicants have sig-
nificantly more assets immediately prior to their application, but not in the several
years before. Although imperfect, the current screening differentiates the appli-
cants in meaningful ways without using assets as an additional criterion.
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Chapter 1
The Long-Term Impact of Business
Cycles on Innovation: Evidence from
the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology 1
1.1 Introduction
Allocating talent to innovative activities is key to promoting a country's long-
term economic growth (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991). However, empirically
1I am very grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Scott Stem, Lee Fleming and especially David Autor for
their generous guidance and detailed feedback on this project. I also thank Pierre Azoulay, Panle
Barwick, JB Doyle, Joseph Hadzima, Ben Jones, Jaimie Lee, Roman Lubynsky, Hong Luo, John
S. Reed, Attoinette Schoar, David Simon, Heidi Williams, Minyuan Zhao, and numerous seminar
participants at Brandeis, Case Western, Cornerstone Research, Harvard Business School, MDRC,
MIT, the NBER Productivity Lunch, the 2012 NBER Summer Institute Innovation Policy and the
Economy meeting, Ohio State University, the 5th Searle Center Conference on Innovation and
Entrepreneurship, UBC Sauder School of Business, UC Berkeley Innovation Seminar, UIUC, and
University of Toronto Rotman School of Management for helpful comments and suggestions. I'm
grateful to Suzanne Berger, Maggy Bruzelius, Claude Canizares, Daniel Hastings, Deborah Liver-
man, Joseph Recchio, Ri Romano, Lydia Snover, and especially Gregory Harris for help with data
collection. This project was supported by the Kauman Foundation. All errors are my own.
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we know little about what factors affect talented individuals' innovative output.
Do short-term shocks to individuals' career choices have a long-term impact on
innovation? Who are the people most affected? In this paper, I provide empirical
evidence to answer these questions by exploring one particular source of exoge-
nous variation: economic conditions at the time of college graduation. Using in-
dividual patent output as a measure of innovative activities, I estimate the causal
impact of initial labor market conditions on the long-term patent production of a
sample of highly skilled individuals: the alumni of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT).
To show how initial labor market conditions could affect an individual's long-
term patent production, I develop a two-sector two-period model. My model com-
bines features from standard static Roy models (Roy, 1951; Willis and Rosen, 1979;
Gould, 2002; Heckman and Honore, 1990; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008) as well
as models with occupation-specific and task-specific human capital (Neal, 1995;
Gibbons and Waldman, 2004). The theory indicates that, by changing initial ca-
reer choices, initial economic conditions could affect future patent production in
two ways. First, if individuals acquire occupation-specific human capital on the
job, initial market conditions could affect individuals' long-term occupational af-
filiations.2 Second, by altering graduates' career paths, initial economic conditions
could affect their future level of human capital, even when there is no effect on
long-term occupational affiliations.
I examine the empirical implications of my model using a newly constructed
longitudinal data set on the patenting history of everyone who received a Bach-
elor's degree from MIT between 1980 and 2005. I match the alumni to the U.S.
2Oyer (2006, 2008) provides empirical evidence on this observation. There are also other causes
for sticky jobs, such as search frictions and employer's uncertainty about the workers' skill (Gib-
bons et al., 2005; Oreopoulos et al., 2012). I discuss their implications in Section 1.2.
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inventor database from Lai et al. (2011b) based on names and locations.3 My data
include 27,145 graduates with over 475,000 person-year observations. Around 16%
of the graduates have produced at least one patent in the years I study. Overall, the
inventors have produced nearly 25,000 patents and received over 323,000 patent ci-
tations by the end of 2010. I link the patent data to individual-level administrative
records on demographics and academic performance at MIT to control for a rich
set of characteristics in my empirical analysis.
Since MIT is one of the major technology-based universities, MIT alumni are
particularly suited for the purpose of this study. My sample has nearly 24,000 en-
gineering and science graduates, who constitute 0.24% of the total number of en-
gineering and science bachelor's degree recipients between 1980 and 2005 (NCES,
2011).4 Previous studies have shown that firms founded by MIT alumni generate
hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue and hundreds of thousands of jobs in the
U.S. (Roberts and Eesley, 2009). It is thus not surprising that many alumni are pro-
ductive inventors. The MIT alumni in my sample have produced around 1.2% of
the utility patents with U.S. origin granted between 1981 and 2010 (USPTO, 2011).
An average patent produced by the MIT graduates in my sample receives approx-
imately 1 citation per year since the year of patent application, which is twice as
much as an average U.S. utility patent produced during the same period.
I find that adverse labor market conditions at the time of college gradua-
tion lead to an increase in the future patent production of MIT alumni. A one-
percentage-point increase in the national unemployment rate in the year of sched-
3The raw patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) do not
provide unique identifiers for inventors, making it difficult to track the output of an inventor over
time. Lai et al. (2011b) provide a solution by employing a Bayesian supervised learning approach
to match inventors to U.S. patents.
4Over 17,000 graduates in my sample are engineering majors, equivalent to 0.6% of the total
engineering graduates between 1980 and 2005. There are over 4000 degree-granting institutions in
the National Center of Education Statistics (NCES) population.
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uled graduation increases the average graduate's annual patent output by around
5%, or approximately 2.5 patents per year for an average size cohort of 1000 grad-
uates. A 1.25 standard deviation decrease in the equity market return during the
students' sophomore and junior years has a similar effect. The effect of initial eco-
nomic conditions on patent production increases over time and is largest between
10 and 20 years after graduation, which are also graduates' peak inventive years.
Meanwhile, economic fluctuations have no measurable effect on the contempora-
neous innovative output of graduates.
There are two possible explanations for these findings, which are not mutually
exclusive. First, more graduates may become inventors as a result of graduating in
a worse economy (changes at the extensive margin). Second, inventors who grad-
uate in a worse economy may be more productive (changes at the intensive mar-
gin). Comparing the patent production of the 1980-1995 cohorts during their first
15 years after graduation, I find no evidence for changes at the extensive margin.
Inventors from recession cohorts are not ex ante more likely to patent, where I use
their cumulative grade point average (GPA) at MIT as a measure of their inventive
ability at the time of graduation.5 Thus, graduates who become inventors would
most likely patent regardless of initial labor market conditions, but graduating in
a worse economy increases the number of patents they produce.
The increase in patent production due to graduating in adverse labor market
conditions comes primarily from science majors working in non-software engi-
neering sectors, such as chemical, drugs and medical industries. Initial economic
conditions have no significant effect on the distribution of the inventors' long-term
sector. Furthermore, graduating in a worse economy has a significantly negative
effect on the time that an inventor takes to produce their first patent. Taken to-
5I normalize the GPA by major and cohort. The normalized GPA significantly predicts future
patent production.
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gether, these results suggest that the accumulation of human capital is likely to be
the main channel through which initial labor market conditions affect long-term
patent production. The most plausible explanation is that inventors from reces-
sion cohorts either start working in patent producing sectors sooner or are more
likely to go to graduate school, though my data do not allow me to determine the
relative importance of the these two channels.
I show that initial conditions affect the patent production of inventors with
relatively low GPAs. Graduates with the highest inventive ability upon gradu-
ation do not seem to be affected. Consistent with the finding that the relatively
less inventive individuals produce the marginal patents, those patents also receive
slightly fewer citations than the average and median patents in my sample.6 These
results suggest that there exists positive sorting into patent production, where the
most talented inventors produce the same patents regardless of their graduating
economic conditions.
My results have several important implications. First, I provide some of the
first empirical evidence on how talented individuals invent. Despite the large
number of studies on the patent production of firms,7 very few papers examine
the determinants of patent production at the individual level. Compared with
61t is important to note that the marginal patents still receive more citations than the average
and median of all U.S. utility patents.
7This literature provides ample evidence on the economic value of patented inventions. At the
firm-level, the number of patents produced by a firm strongly and positively correlates with its re-
search and development (R&D) expenditure, and this relationship holds across different industries
(Griliches, 1990). Other inputs such as venture capital funding also significantly increase patents
(Kortum and Lerner, 2000). Different measures of patent production, such as citation-weighted
patent count, number of patents per R&D dollar, citations per patent, and a weighted index of mul-
tiple indicators of patent quality, are all found to boost firms' market value and productivity (Co-
manor and Scherer, 1969; Trajtenberg, 1990; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Hagedoom and Cloodt,
2003; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Hall et al., 2005). Studies also directly calibrate the eco-
nomic value of patents using patent renewal data and surveys, and show that the value increases
in the number of citations received (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Lanjouw et al., 1998; Harhoff
et al., 1999). Although not all inventions are patentable, firms patent most of the inventions that
can be patented, even in industries where patent protection is relatively unimportant (Mansfield,
1986; Cohen et al., 2000).
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previous studies, my data have distinct advantages, as I observe a large group of
potential innovators with homogenous training, characteristics, and abilities. Pre-
vious work such as Amesse et al. (1991), Kerr (2008), and Jones (2009) primarily
uses samples of only inventors to study their behavior and characteristics. 8 With-
out a comparison group of non-inventors, these studies do not shed light on vital
issues such as what leads talented individuals to invent. My data also include
a rich set of individual characteristics, which helps to determine the factors that
affect patent production.9 Furthermore, my results are relevant for understand-
ing how top engineering and science students in the U.S. innovate, which has key
policy implications.? For instance, Romer (2001) argues that a top priority of the
innovation policy in the U.S. should be to increase the supply of engineers and
scientists. My results provide a first step towards quantifying the actual return, in
terms of producing patented inventions, of a potential policy that provides incen-
tives for engineering and science students to pursue careers in innovative sectors.
This study also presents some of the first evidence on the links between busi-
ness cycles, talent allocation, and long-term innovation at the micro-level. A liter-
ature has analyzed the contemporaneous relationships between business cycles and
relevant outcomes, including labor productivity (Bernanke and Parkinson, 1991;
Goldin, 2000), technological progress (Field, 2003; Nicholas, 2003, 2008), and ven-
ture capital investment (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2011). My study complements
8One exception is the study by Ding et al. (2006), which finds that female life scientists are less
likely to patent than male life scientists.
91t also helps verify the accuracy of my matching procedure. For example, although I do not use
majors at MIT in my matching, the engineering and science majors in my sample are significantly
more likely to patent than the other majors.
Compared with other top engineering and ivy league universities, MIT admits similar stu-
dents based on standardized test scores(Grove, 2011). The 25th and 75th percentiles of the SAT
math score of admitted students at MIT are 740 and 800, respectively. Other top engineering pro-
grams such as California Institute of Technology and the engineering school of Cornell University
have similar score range for their admitted students. The 25th percentile of the SAT math score
at ivy league universities and other top universities such as Stanford University and University of
Chicago is around 680, and the 75th percentile is around 770.
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this literature by showing that through changing talent allocation, business cycles
could also have a dynamic effect on future inventive output. Since adverse labor
market conditions change the relative demand for labor of different sectors, my
results suggest that sectors producing more patented inventions are less cyclical,
and that increasing labor demand from highly pro-cyclical sectors could poten-
tially have a negative impact on long-term innovation. For example, graduating
during a recession leads to higher graduate degree attainment and higher enroll-
ment in PhD programs in science and engineering (Bedard and Herman, 2008;
Kahn, 2010). In contrast, finance is a prominent example of a highly pro-cyclical
sector (Oyer, 2008). However, the causal effect of going to finance (or graduate
school) right after college on an individual's long-term innovative output remains
unexamined. Although I do not directly estimate such effects in this paper, my
results suggest that shocks to initial career choices could have long-term effect on
producing innovations, pointing to the importance of potential follow-on research
that addresses these open questions.
An influential line of work shows that, because innovation generates posi-
tive spillovers, innovators receive inadequate compensation relative to their con-
tribution to society. As a result, the equilibrium level of innovation is less than
optimal (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). While the patent system is designed to help
inventors capture at least some of the benefits from their innovations, previous
empirical studies suggest that there are large, positive social externalities to the
creation of new ideas that are not fully internalized by the patent system (Mans-
field et al., 1977; Jaffe, 1986; Trajtenberg, 1989; Jaffe et al., 1993; Caballero and Jaffe,
1993; Nadiri, 1993; Cockburn and Henderson, 1994; Hall, 1996; Jones and Williams,
1998; Hall et al., 2001; Bloom et al., 2012)." Since wages do not perfectly mea-
l It is possible that patented inventions also generate negative externalities through patent races
or patent blocking, but this large body of empirical evidence suggests that the positive spillovers
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sure inventors' marginal product of labor, the growing literature that examines the
effect of graduating economic conditions on private returns does not have clear
implications for social welfare. For example, graduating in adverse labor market
conditions has a negative long-term impact on the earnings of college graduates
(Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012), the career development of aspiring invest-
ment bankers (Oyer, 2008), and the productivity of economists(Oyer, 2006). In
contrast, this paper is one of the first to focus on an outcome that generates po-
tentially large social externalities.1 2 My results suggest that a thorough welfare
analysis of the impact of adverse labor market conditions should account for the
potential social gains of the increased innovative output.13
My study also contributes to this literature by analyzing the relevance of sort-
ing, which is important for both interpreting empirical results as well as conduct-
ing potential welfare analysis. For instance, Oyer (2008) finds that the MBA grad-
uates who enter investment banking as a result of graduating in a booming stock
market are more likely to stay in the industry. He argues that this is evidence for
the existence of occupation-specific human capital in investment banking. How-
ever, without studying selection, he cannot exclude the possibility that graduates
with higher innate ability could self-select into banking during booms.1 4 The main
outweigh the negative. Even with patent protection, research and development still creates sizable
social returns that are at least twice as large as the private returns. Furthermore, patent citations
are often used as a direct measure of knowledge spillovers (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993; Jaffe et al.,
1993; Hall et al., 2005).
12Another study that looks at a socially important outcome is Schoar and Zuo (2011), who show
that CEOs who start their careers during recessions have more conservative management styles.
13To perform such a welfare analysis, one would also need to observe several additional out-
comes such as wages inclusive of non-pecuniary benefits and other measures of innovation like
academic publications and new firm founding activities.
14Boehm and Watzinger (2011) is one of the first studies that examine sorting. They find that
economics PhD candidates who graduate in a recession positively select into academia, in the
sense that the average graduate staying in academia in a recession is better. But they use ex post
publication records to measure ex ante ability. In contrast, Oyer (2006) finds that economics PhD
graduates who enter the labor market in a recession tend to get jobs at lower-ranked schools, and
consequently produce less research. This suggests that initial labor market conditions could have
opposite effect on long-term outcomes through sorting. Genda et al. (2010) and Oreopoulos et al.
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difficulty in empirically identifying selection is the lack of a good measure of ex
ante ability. In my data, I am able to use cumulative grade point average (GPA) at
MIT as a uniform measure of innate ability to invent, which is is fully determined
by the time of graduation.15 I show that my results are not driven by selection, and
that it is not the case that more skilled graduates become inventors as a result of
graduating in bad economic conditions. Furthermore, I find that initial economic
conditions only affect the patent production of inventors with relatively low GPAs,
suggesting that this group may be particularly sensitive to changes in the relative
incentives of going into different sectors upon graduation.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 derives the theoretical predic-
tions using a simple two-period Roy-style model. Section 1.3 discusses the data
and the patent matching procedure. I present the estimates of the main effect of
initial labor market conditions on future patent production in Section 1.4, and de-
compose the effect in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
By affecting initial career choices, initial labor market conditions could affect
long-term patent production in two ways: changing the level of human capital
accumulated over time, and changing the future occupational affiliation. In this
section, I formalize this idea using a two-sector two-period Roy-style model. Com-
pared to a standard static Roy model, my model has two distinct features. The first
is that I allow individuals to switch to a different sector after they enter the labor
market. I define the path of human capital accumulation, and discuss the scenar-
(2012) find low ability workers to be more sensitive to initial career shocks than high ability work-
ers. This is not evidence for positive sorting into high paying sectors since the distributions of low
and high ability workers are unknown.
1I normalize GPA by major and cohort. The normalized GPA strongly predicts future patent
production.
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ios in which individuals may have the incentive to switch sectors even at the cost
of losing their accumulated occupation-specific human capital. The second fea-
ture is that I specify the externality of patent production. As a result, the career
paths individuals choose to maximize their own utility could differ from the so-
cial optimum. I use the model to show how a temporary shock to initial career
choices could affect patent production in the future. I also discuss the relevance of
self-selection.
1.2.1 Assumptions
I consider the career choice problem of a single graduating cohort with P indi-
viduals. The economy contains two sectors of production, inventive ("I") and non-
inventive ("N"). Empirical examples of patent-producing sectors include graduate
school in science or engineering and industries such as bio-technology and electri-
cal engineering. Examples of non-patent-producing sectors include finance and
management consulting. I assume that individuals live for two periods. Dur-
ing each period, a person is able to choose her sector of employment after ob-
serving the state of the economy. Let Q' = I or N denote the sector chosen by
individual i in period t = 1, 2. There are four possible career paths: (Q!, Q?) E
{(I, I), (I, N), (N, I), (N, N)}. An example of (N,I) is working in finance or consult-
ing for two years before going back to graduate school in science or engineering.
An individual chooses a career path that maximizes her total utility:
Ui(QI, Q2) = WI (Q1)+ #W/(Q2IQj) + ZPatji
where W (Q ) is her wage in sector Q in period 1, Wj2 (Q? Qf) is her wage in sector
Q2 in period 2 conditional on working in sector Q!, and # < 1 is her discount rate.
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I introduce the externality of patented inventions by assuming that each person's
utility function depends on other individuals' patent production. The weight 6
thus captures, in reduced form, the magnitude of the externality from creating new
patented technology. If 6 > 0, externality is positive, and if 6 < 0, it is negative.
Earnings and human capital
Each graduate i is endowed with sector specific human capital, denoted hi,1
and hi,N, which determine her initial wages. For simplicity, wages are linear in
human capital and depend on the state of the economy. In period 1,
W1 (I) = hi,1;
W|l (N) = hi,N s
where s is the change in the wage in the non-inventive sector that depends on the
state of the economy in period 1. I assume that s is constant across individuals
and only affects wages in the non-inventive sector. The latter is without loss of
generality, as only the change in the relative wage between the two sectors matters
for equilibrium patent output. I discuss the equilibria in two cases: s = 0 and s > 0.
In addition to their initial endowments, workers develop occupation-specific
human capital on the job, denoted k1 and kN- Thus wages in period 2 are
W 2 (I I) = hi,1 + k1;
Wi2(N|I) = hi,N
W 2(I|N) = hi,1
W 2(NIN) = hi,N + kN- (1.1)
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Notice that I assume the shock s is temporary, only affecting wages in period 1.
To focus on the effect of initial economic conditions, I assume that the economic
conditions in period 2 do not affect wages in period 2.
Patent production
Since graduates rarely produce patents right after graduation, I assume that
patent production only occurs in period 2. Let Pati be the patent production of
individual i in period 2. Define
Pati(QIlQj) f Wy(I|Q ) if Q? = I;
0 ifQ?=N.
That is, all patents are produced by the inventive sector. Notice that an indi-
vidual is more inventive if she works in the inventive sector throughout her career
(i.e. choosing (I, I)) than if she only works in the inventive sector in period 2 (i.e.
choosing (N, I)). In order to obtain a closed-form solution, I assume that a gradu-
ate's patent production equals her inventive human capital in period 2. The results
would be qualitatively the same if patent production were some other weakly in-
creasing function of inventive human capital.
1.2.2 Career path and patent production
Benchmark case: no shock
I start with the benchmark case where s = 0. An individual i chooses the
career path (Q1, Q?) that maximizes U (Q!, Q?). Since she cannot affect others'
patent production, maximizing U (Q!, Q?) is equivalent to maximizing U (Q , Q?)=
28
W.1(Q1) + #W2 (Q2I Q1). We have
Uj(J, I) = hij + # (hij + kr); (1.2)
U(I, N) hij + 3hi,N; (1.3)
Ui(N, I) hi,N + hI; (1.4)
U(N, N) = hi,N+ (hi,N + kN). (1.5)
Proposition 1.2.1. (Competitive Equilibrium) An individual chooses (I, I) if zi f: and
(N,N) otherwise, where zi = hi, - hi,N and k I - kN-
Proof. By comparing Equation (1.2) to Equation (1.5), it follows that
(1) An individual chooses (II) if and only if zi 2 max kj, -#k, Z .
(2) An individual chooses (I,N) if and only if zi < -k, and zi max {0, #kN}-
(3) An individual chooses (N,I) if and only if zi kN and zi < min {0, -k 1}.
(4) An individual chooses (N,N) if and only if zi < min {kN, 1±' f kN
Since k, and kN are non-negative, both (I,N) and (N,I) are implausible. Moreover,
pO < /3kN N and -- 3 - k > -kr. Thus, an individual chooses (1, 1) if zi > fO
and (N,N) otherwise. l
Proposition 1 shows that individuals work in the inventive sector in period 1
if and only if the premium of working in I over N is sufficiently high. When s = 0,
they have no incentive to switch to a different sector in period 2. It follows that
patent production is
(hi, + k) if zi > -O;
Pati = 1+3{0~ 1 ± 1 if Z O
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Social optimum in the benchmark case
Consider the problem of a social planner who chooses the career paths of all
individuals to maximize social welfare, E U,(Q , Q?). Because patent production
directly enters agents' utility, this is equivalent to choosing (Qi, Q2) to maximize
SPi(Q1, Q2) = WI(Ql) + #W(QIQI) + 6(P - 1)Patj(QilQ1).
The following proposition shows that when patented inventions generate a posi-
tive externality, the equilibrium size of the inventive sector in period 2 is less than
socially optimal.
Proposition 1.2.2. When 6 > 0 (i.e. positive externality), the social optimum has higher
total patent production than the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Those who choose (II) do not change their path in the social optimum. Since
6(P - 1)Pati(III) = 6(P - 1)W 2(I II) > 0, it is easy to see that individuals with
-6(P - 1)Wi2(III) < U,(I, I) - U(N, N) < 0 choose (N, N) while the social planner
would choose (I, I) or (N,I) for them. Thus, more individuals would work in the
inventive sector in the second period and the total patent production is higher.16
Temporary shock to the wage in the non-inventive sector
Now, consider a temporary shock to the economy in period 1 that changes the
wage in the non-inventive sector, Wi(N), from hi,N to hi,N + S. Suppose s > 0, so
the non-inventive sector becomes temporarily more attractive in period 1.
16 do not explicitly solve for the social optimum here since it depends on both zi and hir. It
also requires more assumptions on 6(P - 1), k1 , and kN. For instance, given certain 6(P - 1), kj,
and kN, it is possible for social planner to choose (N,I). I skip deriving the specific conditions here
since they are irrelevant to the empirical predictions.
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Proposition 1.2.3. (Competitive Equilibrium) There are two cases when s > 0.
Case I: s < kN ± 3kI. An individual chooses (II) if zi s--k and (NN) otherwise, where
zi = hi, - hi,N and k I - kN-
Case II: s > kN+ 3kI. An individual chooses (II) if z s , (NI) if kN 3k
and (NN) otherwise.
Proof. Compared to the benchmark case, U (N, I) = hi,N+ s + 3iI and Ui(N, N) =
hi,N ± s + 3 (hi,N± kN). The derivation then follows the same steps as the proof to
Proposition 1. E
Graduates who choose (N,N) before have no incentive to change their career
path. As the return to working in the non-inventive sector in period 1 increases,
some who choose (1,I) in the benchmark case may switch to (N,I) or (N,N). No-
tice that initial jobs are sticky because of positive human capital accumulation. If
k, = kN = 0, then the temporary shock in period 1 has no effect on individuals'
occupation in period 2. Because starting in the non-inventive sector helps a grad-
uate to gain specific human capital in N, some of the individuals that switch to
N in period 1 stay in N in period 2. However, if the incentive to working in N is
sufficiently high, it would attract workers with high premium of working in I over
N to temporarily work in N in period 1, but switch back to the inventive sector in
period 2.
Consider the case where s > kN+ k1, the change in an individual's patent
production relative to the benchmark case is
(hi1+ k1) if -3< zi < kN
APati= -k 1  if'kN3s<Ok.
0- otheris1+
0 otherwise.
31
Therefore, a shock that temporarily makes working in the non-inventive sec-
tor more profitable in period 1 affects patent production in period 2. In the pres-
ence of such a shock, patent production is lower as fewer graduates work in the
inventive sector and some of those who still do have less inventive human capital.
There are two channels for the effect. When f-: zi < kN, an individual switches
from (II) to (N,N), and her patent production decreases from (hij + k1 ) to 0. I refer
to this as the "occupational choice channel," where an individual's patent produc-
tion changes as a result of working in a different sector. When kN z < j3k, an
individual switches from (II) to (N,I), and her patent production decreases from
(hi,1 + k1) to hij. I call this the "human capital channel" since her occupational
affiliation in period 2 does not change.17 The key difference between the occupa-
tional choice and the human capital channels is that in the former, the effect results
from graduates switching sectors in the long-run, whereas in the latter it does not.18
Similarly, if s < 0, individuals who work in (N,N) may switch to (1,I) or (I,N). Total
patent production would be higher than in the benchmark case. Without knowing
the sign of s, the effect of adverse labor market conditions at the time of gradua-
tion on future patent production could be either positive or negative and remains
an empirical question.
17The human capital channel only occurs when s is sufficiently large and k, > 0. If k, = 0, then
there is obviously no change in patent production.
18There are several ways to extend the predictions of the model. First, one can easily add labor
market frictions, such as search costs, but they would only complement the effect of the human
capital accumulation on occupational choice. Substituting labor market frictions for human capital
accumulation is equivalent to assuming that k, and kN only matter for earnings but not patent
production. In this case, patent production only changes through the occupational choice channel.
Second, one can include non-pecuniary returns of working in different occupations. See Bayer et al.
(2011); Maurel and D'Haultfoeuille (2011) for examples of estimating the non-pecuniary returns in
an extended Roy model. It is possible that individuals fully internalize the externality of their
patent production by deriving enough non-pecuniary benefits from innovating. In this case, the
equilibrium patent production is the same as in the social optimum. Finally, switching jobs could
be more likely than what the stylized model predicts. For instance, if individuals get positive non-
pecuniary returns from trying different jobs or if they have uncertainty about the returns from
working in a particular sector.
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Sorting
As the model shows, initial labor market conditions are unlikely to affect ev-
ery graduate's patent production. I thus classify the workers into three groups:
"non-inventors," "marginal inventors," and "infra-marginal inventors." Regard-
less of graduating economic conditions, the non-inventors never patent and the
infra-marginal inventors always patent. However, the marginal inventors pro-
duce patents only if they graduate in certain economic conditions. Importantly, the
infra-marginal inventors' patent production could change at the intensive margin.
Hence, the total change in patent production, due to a change in initial economic
conditions, has two components: patents from the marginal inventors (changes at
the extensive margin) and patents from the infra-marginal inventors (changes at
the intensive margin).19
For any potential policy analysis, it is important to understand where the
marginal patents come from. Are marginal inventors more or less skilled than
infra-marginal inventors? Do marginal patents have higher or lower quality than
average patents? Suppose a policy aims to increase patent production by tem-
porarily rewarding individuals for entering the inventive sector upon college grad-
uation. This is equivalent to introducing a negative s in the simple model. If the
most skilled workers are already working in the inventive sector, the return to such
a policy, in terms of the increase in the production of innovation, is decreasing in
the size of the inventive sector.
To see this mathematically, I consider the special case where # = 1 and k, = kN-
19Since I assume that the non-inventive sector has no patent production, changes in patent pro-
duction at the intensive margin could only happen through the human capital channel. In practice,
there are different occupations with different levels of patent production, so both channels could
potentially change patent production at the extensive and intensive margins.
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I also assume that
hi y 2 02
~ ~ N I , and zi = hij - hi,N ~N(O, o).
hiN 02 2N ) IN UN/
Proposition 1.2.4. E (hi,1|zi = s) is decreasing in s if and only if pIz = Corr(hi,, zi) < 0
(i.e., o-2 > o-N2
Proof. Given the distributional assumptions, E (hi, Izi = s) = p + przu s. Thus
8E(hi,1 ii = Pizoa < 0 if and only if pIz < 0. Elas
Without any shock, E (hi,1 | Q = I) = E (hi, |zi > 0) = , + przo- A(0), where
A(0) = <(0)/<b(0) is the inverse mills ratio. Thus, prz > 0 implies that there is
positive sorting into the inventive sector, defined as E (hijIQ = I) > E (hi,1). In
other words, the average inventive skill (h1 ) of the inventors is higher than the
average for the entire cohort. When s becomes marginally negative, individuals
with z, = s 0 switch from (N,N) to (1,I). The gain in total patent production is
E (hij Izi = s) + kr. Proposition 4 shows that, as s becomes more negative, the gain
in patent production is decreasing if and only if there is positive sorting into the
inventive sector.
In practice, it is possible that a shock changes the composition of workers in
each sector through sorting even without affecting the size of either sector. For
instance, in response to a shock, people with high inventive ability may select out
of the inventive sector and get replaced by less skilled inventors. In the empirical
section, I identify the nature of sorting by examining how the distribution of inven-
20Negative sorting implies that the most inventive individuals are inclined to work in the non-
inventive sector. This is counter-intuitive, but theoretically possible, for instance if the return to the
inventive skill is higher in the non-inventive sector than the inventive sector.
2 1This could happen in a standard Roy model if the return to skill in the inventive sector de-
creases. See Gould (2002); Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) for detailed discussions on similar mod-
els.
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tors' ex ante ability changes with graduating economic conditions. These results
are discussed in detail in Section 1.5.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Sample Construction
Data from MIT
MIT Office of the Registrar and the Alumni Association have generously pro-
vided individual-level data on every student that received a bachelor's degree
from MIT between 1980 and 2005.22 I observe basic demographic information such
as gender and ethnicity, as well as information about their degree such as year of
graduation, major(s) and cumulative grade point average. I group the graduates
into three fields based on their major: Engineering; Science; and Others ("Non-
SE"). 23 I also observe the current employer of the alumni as self-reported on Infinite
Connection in June 2011.24 For those with available information on their employer,
I assign their currently employed sector as Technology & Industrial, Academia, or
Non-Science and Non-Engineering ("Non-SE"). Appendix 1.8.1 explains how I as-
sign the sectors based on the employers.
Patent Matching
To match graduates to their patents, I employ a separate database containing
the full names of all alumni in the base sample as well as their addresses at the city
level. For names, I observe both the Registrar's records and the ones currently used
22Although I have information on individuals that received a graduate degree from MIT during
the same time period, I exclude them from the analysis and focus only on the Bachelor's population.
The graduate population is much more heterogeneous than the undergraduate population.23 For the few incidences of double majors, I use whichever major declared first.24Infinite Connection is an online alumni directory hosted by the MIT Alumni Association.
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by the Alumni Association to contact the alumni. For locations, I observe the last
two work addresses and home addresses reported on Infinite Connection. Each
graduate has at least one home address in the data. For those that have never up-
dated their alumni profiles on Infinite Connection, the home address information
is from their Registrar's records at MIT.
I match this data to the U.S. patent inventor database from Lai et al. (2011b).
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) does not provide unique iden-
tifiers for inventors, making it difficult to track all the patents produced by the
same inventor. Lai et al. (2011b) apply a Bayesian supervised learning approach
and match inventors across all the U.S. utility patents granted between 1975 and
2010. Compared to the raw patent data from USPTO, the database from Lai et al.
(2011b) allows me to match the alumni to inventors rather than patents.2' Since
the amount of individual information provided by an inventor could differ across
patents, matching the alumni to inventors increases the likelihood that all patents
from the same alumni inventor are included.26
I explain the matching procedure in Appendix 1.8.2. Although matching er-
rors are inevitable, they are unlikely to cause serious concerns for my empirical
analysis. First, the summary statistics reported in Table 1.2 show that the science
and engineering students have much higher inventive output than the non-SE stu-
dents. Since the matching errors should be randomly distributed across different
majors, one can use the patent output of the non-SE students as an upper bound
for the amount of false positives. Under the extreme assumption that the non-
25Lai et al. (2011b) present two sets of results using different blocking rules. One minimizes
the probability of lumping multiple individuals as one inventor, while the other minimizes the
probability of splitting one individual into multiple inventors. See Lai et al. (2011a) for a detailed
explanation of their procedure. Since each alumnus can be matched to multiple inventors, errors
from splitting are less of a concern than errors from lumping. Thus I use the former set of results in
my matching. My findings change little if I use the other.26For instance, an inventor with a middle name may list the full middle name on some patents
but only the initial on the others.
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SE students should not produce any patents, there is still a significant amount of
patent production from the science and engineering students. Second, the errors
are not correlated with economic conditions at time of graduation and thus do not
cause omitted variable bias (Figure A1.1). Finally, as patent output is the depen-
dent variable, measuring it with classical measurement errors could only increase
the variance of the residual without generating any bias in the estimator.
I use the matching results to construct the patenting history of the alumni in
my sample. For each graduate in each year after graduation, I calculate the number
of granted patents which were applied for in that year and the subsequent number
of citations received for those patents. The MIT Office of Provost Institutional Re-
search then links the patent data to the base sample with individual characteristics.
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Characteristics
Table 1.1 shows the mean characteristics for four groups: everyone, engineer-
ing majors, science majors, and inventors. 27 68% of all the alumni in my sample are
male; 58% are white; and 41% went to high school in the northeast of the United
States. 63% of the graduates majored in engineering and nearly 25% majored in
science; only 13% of the graduates majored in non-science and non-engineering
("non-SE") fields.28 The engineering majors have less females, while the science
majors have more females. The science majors also have more white and Asian
American students.
Around 16% of all the graduates in my sample are inventors, that is, they have
positive patent production since graduation. The inventors are more likely to be
27An "inventor" is someone with positive patent production since graduation.2 8Around half of the graduates with non-SE majors majored in economics or management.
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male, engineering majors and Caucasian. Less than 4% of the inventors majored in
non-SE fields. The inventors have above average GPA, where the GPA is normal-
ized by major and year of graduation. Specifically, the average normalized GPA of
the inventors is around 0.22 standard deviations higher than the sample average.
About 78% of the sample report their employers on Infinite Connection, based
on which I assign a sector.29 Approximately 45% of the alumni with non-missing
employer information currently work in industries that are generally related to en-
gineering and science, such as technology and industrial. 16% work in academia,
and 26% work in non-SE industries such as finance and consulting. Around 13%
of the alumni work for firms where I cannot immediately assign a sector based on
the firm name.3 ' The inventors have a higher proportion that currently works in
technology and industrial industries and a lower proportion that works in non-SE
industries.
Patent Production
Figure 1-1 plots the average number of patents produced and the number
of citations received in each year since graduation against two x-axes: year since
graduation and year of patent application. All of the four series have an inverse
"U" shape. Patent production increases over time in the first 15 years after grad-
uation, which is consistent with the assumption in the conceptual framework that
individuals accumulate inventive human capital from experience. There is also a
upward trend in patent production before 2000, which is consistent with the aggre-
gate trend in national patent statistics (Hall et al., 2001; USPTO, 2011). Since some
29The employers are as of the last time they updated their alumni profile on Infinite Connection
before June 2011. Although it is possible that the alumni have switched jobs and not updated on
Infinite Connection, I assume that they stay in the same sector, and use the reported employers to
determine the current sector.
30These would include, for example, small firms that do not indicate what they do in the com-
pany name.
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of the patent applications in more recent years are still under review and I only
observe the granted patents, the data are truncated from the right. Thus, there are
downward trends in patent production after 2000. While this is a relevant concern
for the interpretation of descriptive statistics, I will control for the truncation in my
regression analysis.
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for annual patent production. The unit
of observation is person by year. In an average year, an average cohort with a
size of 1000 graduates produces around 52 patents. These patents together receive
on average 681 citations by the end of 2010. Engineering graduates on average
produce more patents than science and non-SE graduates, and non-SE graduates
are the least likely to participate in inventive activities. An average patent from an
MIT alumni inventor receives around 1 citation per year, which is twice as much as
an average patent produced between 1981 and 2010. Since inventors only produce
patents in some years, their annual patent production can be zero.
Table 1.3 shows the distribution of the patents' technology fields by inventors
major. Following Hall et al. (2001), I classify patents into four technology fields
based on their primary class: 1) Computer and Communications; 2) Electrical &
Electronic and Mechanical; 3) Chemical and Drugs & Medical; and 4) Others.
Nearly half of all patents are from graduates majoring in electrical engineering
and computer science (EECS), who patent mostly in computer and communica-
tions. Not surprisingly, alumni inventors tend to patent in their field of study. For
example, graduates who majored in mechanical engineering and material science
patent more in hardware engineering, while those that studied chemical engineer-
ing, chemistry or biology in college patent more in bio-tech related field. Few
patents are in the "Others" field.
31Hall et al. (2001) has six technology categories. I combine Electrical & Electronic and Mechan-
ical into one field. I also combine Chemical and Drugs & Medical into one field.
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1.4 Initial Labor Market Conditions and Patent Out-
put
1.4.1 An Illustrative Example: MIT Class of 1983 versus Class of
1984
Before presenting the regression estimates, I first discuss an illustrative ex-
ample, which compares the patent output of the 1983 versus the 1984 graduate
cohorts. The two classes have similar characteristics, though the class of 1983 has
slightly fewer engineering and science majors (Table A1.2). They overlapped for 3
years at MIT and experienced largely the same economic environment during col-
lege. By far, the most substantial difference between the two classes was the state
of the economy at the time of their graduation. The class of 1983 graduated at the
end of a recession. The annual unemployment rate was 9.6%, and the 2-year equity
market return from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) before their
senior year was 7.8%. By contrast, class of 1984 graduated during a recovery pe-
riod when the annual unemployment rate was 7.5%, and the 2-year CRSP market
return was 50%. Figure 1-2 plots each cohort's average patent output by year of
graduation and year of application. In almost every year, the patent output of the
class of 1983 surpasses the output of the 1984 cohort. The differences are especially
large between 10 and 20 years after graduation. In total, the graduates in the class
of 1983 have produced 2022 patents while the class of 1984 have produced only
1602 patents in their first 25 years after graduation. Table A1.2 shows that both
classes have similar proportion of inventors. The class of 1983 alumni are slightly
more likely to work in the technology and industrial sector and less likely to work
in the non-SE sector, although the differences are not statistically significant in the
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t-test.
1.4.2 Baseline Regression
Specification
For graduate i in year t, I observe the number of patents she produced that
year, denoted by Patit, where this is computed as the number of patents she ap-
plied for in year t that were ultimately granted at some time prior to the end of my
sample. I estimate the following equation:
(Pat)it = G (OR + 6(Controls)ijt + cit) (1.6)
where j denotes the year of graduation, and Rj is either the national unemploy-
ment rate in year j or the CRSP stock market return from September j - 3 to
September j - 1 or both. Since my outcome, the number of patents produce by
each individual in each year, is non-negative and discrete, I estimate Equation (1.6)
using quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson model and G(.) denotes the likelihood
function.32
Following the literature, I use the national unemployment rate in the year of
college graduation as my main measure of initial labor market conditions.33 Al-
though MIT alumni are generally unlikely to be unemployed upon graduation,
the aggregate economy still affects the availability and payoff of certain jobs. As
a result, those graduating in a recession may pursue different career paths than
those graduating in a booming economy. For instance, the MIT Class of 2009, who
32Compared to alternative count models such as negative binomial, the Poisson model has
the advantage of being robust to model mis-specification (Cameron and Trivedi, 2001; Wooldrige,
2002). The quasi-ML Poisson model also accounts for any over dispersion in the data.
33Examples of other studies using the same measure include Kahn (2010); Genda et al. (2010);
Oreopoulos et al. (2012).
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graduated during the financial crisis, still had high job placement rate compara-
ble to the previous classes. But they have a higher proportion going to graduate
school and a lower proportion entering the financial sector (Hastings et al., 2010).
Unfortunately, I do not observe the initial career choices of the 1980-2005 cohorts,
and thus cannot estimate the effect of initial economic conditions on selecting into
different initial placements.
I also control for a rich set of characteristics including gender, age, ethnic-
ity/citizenship, high school region, dummies for fields of study (Engineering, Sci-
ence, and Non-SE), and GPA standardized by major and cohort. The log of the
federal research and development expenditure as a ratio of U.S. GDP in the year
of college graduation controls for the demand for engineers and scientists (Gools-
bee, 1998; Ryoo and Rosen, 2004; Majumdar and Shimotsu, 2006; National Science
Foundation, 2010). To control for the potential nonlinear effects of patent applica-
tion year, I include dummies for the application years. I also control for experience
dummies, which are indicator variables that equal 1 for each year since graduation.
Results
Table 1.4 shows the coefficient estimates for the two measures of initial labor
market conditions, using quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson models with differ-
ent levels of controls. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and
clustered by cohort and application year.4 The effect of the unemployment rate is
robust to alternative controls and the inclusion of the stock market return. Column
(3) shows that a one percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate
at the time of graduation increases the expected annual patent output of that cohort
by almost 5.4%. Since an average cohort with a size of 1000 graduates produces 52
34The effect of the unemployment rate is robust to clustering the standard errors by cohort.
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patents, a 5.4% change is equivalent to 2.8 patents per year. The effect of the stock
market return is only significant when all controls are included. Column (6) shows
that a one standard deviation decrease in the stock market return, equivalent to
around 18%, increases the expected future annual patent output of the graduat-
ing cohort by 4.2%. However, it does not have any additional effect on patenting
once the unemployment rate is included (since these are alternative measures of
economic conditions). Table A1.3 reports the coefficient estimates for individual
characteristics from Column (7). As the descriptive statistics suggest, engineering
and science majors are significantly more likely to produce patents than the non-
SE majors. Engineering and science majors with higher GPA produce significantly
more patents. Female graduates are less likely to produce patents.35
Figure 1-3 plots the persistence of the impact of graduating conditions on fu-
ture patent production. I interact R with the experience dummies and plot the
coefficients of the interaction terms against year since graduation for 25 years after
graduation.36 The effect of unemployment rate is insignificant in early years but
becomes significant and persistent between 10 and 20 years after graduation. The
effect of stock market return peaks around 13 years after graduation but is largely
insignificant.
Robustness Checks
Table A1.4 in the Appendix shows a set of robustness checks. Panel A shows
the results in OLS and 2SLS using birth year dummies as the instruments for grad-
uating economic conditions. Panel B restricts the sample to balance panels from
the 1980-1995 cohorts on patent production in the first 15 years after graduation
35Ding et al. (2006) find that there exists gender difference in the tendency to patent among the
life scientists. Female scientists are less likely to patent than male scientists.
36 Only the early few cohorts are observed 25 years after graduation.
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or between 2000 and 2010. Panel C excludes the top inventors in two ways: first
by using an indicator variable that equals 1 if the annual number of patents pro-
duced is greater than zero as the dependent variable; and second by excluding the
100 graduates with the most patent production. The results that initial labor mar-
ket conditions significantly affect future patent production are robust across all the
alternative specifications. Table A1.5 in the Appendix shows that initial labor mar-
ket conditions do not change the students' choice of major at the time of college
graduation.
1.4.3 Initial Conditions versus Current Conditions
To see whether contemporaneous economic conditions affect patent output
in addition to economic conditions at the time of graduation, I use the following
specification:
(Pat)it = G (ORj + Rt + 6(Controls)ut + cit) (1.7)
where I include Rt , the labor market condition at time t, as well its 1 or 2-year
lag in various specifications. Since the lagged current conditions are just the initial
conditions for recent graduates, I exclude all the observations where t (the obser-
vation year) is less than j + 2 when I include one lag and j + 3 when I include two
lags . Since I can no longer control for application year fixed effects, I include the
application year and cohort year trends.Estimation of this model on the full sam-
ple is no longer possible since patents applied for more recently are less likely to
show up in the data due to the lag between patent application and patent grant.
To ensure that there is no spurious correlation caused by data truncation, I run
the regression only on the sample with observation-years before 2000. Table 1.5
shows that the coefficients on initial conditions do not change from the previous
table. Contemporaneous economic conditions have no significant effect on patent
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output.
1.5 Understanding the Effect of Initial Labor Market
Conditions
The unemployment rate at the time of college graduation has a positive and
significant impact on a graduate's patent production over the next 20 years. Two
important questions remain. Which individuals' patent production is most af-
fected by initial labor market conditions? Do marginal patents have higher or
lower quality than average patents? As discussed in Section 1.2, the answers to
these questions have important implications for potential welfare and policy anal-
ysis. In order to frame the discussion, I define the following terminology.
a) "Marginal inventors" are graduates whose decision to become inventors
(i.e., produce at least one patent) is affected by graduating economic conditions.
b) "Infra-marginal inventors" are graduates who become inventors regardless
of initial labor market conditions.
c) "Marginal patents" are patents whose production is contingent upon labor
market conditions at graduation. Marginal patents could be produced by either
marginal inventors or infra-marginal inventors.
The characteristics of the marginal inventors and the marginal patents are of
primary interest to me as they provide vital information about the impact of ini-
tial labor market conditions. In this section, I provide empirical analysis in two
steps. First, I identify which of the marginal patents come from marginal inven-
tors and which come from infra-marginal inventors. Second, I study the character-
istics of the marginal patents and how they differ from the average patents. Since
the analysis is cross-sectional (i.e., at the inventor-level or patent-level), it is im-
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possible to control for application year fixed effects as in the panel data. In order
to accommodate the fact that each cohort has experienced a different number of
post-graduation years, I use a balanced panel that includes the 1980-1995 cohorts,
observed for the first 15 years after graduation.37 Hence, all the cohorts have the
same amount of time to produce patents. Column (B1) in Table A1.4 also confirms
that the results from the previous section hold for a balanced panel. A one percent-
age point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation increases the
average annual patent production in the first 15 years after graduation by around
4.2% for the 1980-1995 cohorts. The average number of patents produced per per-
son per year is 0.054. Thus, a 4.2% change in the annual patent production for a
cohort is equivalent to around 34 patents in 15 years.
1.5.1 Decomposition
Entry into Invention
I first estimate the effect of the initial unemployment rate on the probability of
becoming an inventor in the first 5,10, or 15 years after graduation. To test whether
there are more graduates producing patents from recession cohorts, I estimate the
following Linear Probability Model:3 8
Pr(Dj = 1) = OR, + 6(Controls)ij + Ec. (1.8)
where Rj is the national unemployment rate at the time of graduation, Di 1 for
all graduates who patent in the first 5, 10, or 15 years after graduation, and obser-
vations are at the individual level. I control for a linear and quadratic cohort grad-
uation year trend since different cohorts experience different aggregate patenting
37This excludes the year of graduation.
38Probit and Logit models give almost identical estimates.
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trends in their first 15 years. I also control for observed individual characteristics.
Table 1.6 reports the estimated effects. Although the coefficient estimates are
small and positive for 5 and 10 years after graduation, they are not significant
once I control for individual characteristics (Columns (2) and (4)). The coefficient
estimates for 15 years are also very small and insignificant (Columns (5) and (6)).
Thus, the initial unemployment rate has no significant effect on the probability of
becoming an inventor.
Distribution of Inventors' Ability and Characteristics
As shown in the conceptual framework, if initial economic conditions change
the nature of sorting into inventive careers, it is possible that the average inven-
tors from a recession cohort have higher innate ability even when the number of
inventors stays the same.39 To examine whether the distribution of inventors' abil-
ity changes with initial labor market conditions, I estimate the following equation
only on the sample of inventors:
(ability)i = OR + 6(Controls)i + ei. (1.9)
where ability is measured by GPA, and I control for the linear and quadratic co-
hort graduation year trend. Since the regression is estimated only on the sample
of inventors, 6 is the effect of the initial unemployment rate on the ability of the
average inventors." If the inventors from a recession cohort have higher ability
391n a standard Roy model, this would happen if the return to skill in the more inventive sector
increases.
"
0This set-up is similar to the reduced-form specification that tests the difference between the
marginal and average outcomes in Gruber et al. (1999) and Chandra and Staiger (2007). In theory,
I can use the log of risk-adjusted proportion of inventors, instrumented by Rj, on the right-hand
side to test whether the average ability of inventors changes with any change in the size of the
inventor population induced by initial labor market conditions. However, doing so requires a first
stage where Rj significantly affects the proportion of inventors, which does not exist in the data.
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than the inventors from a boom cohort, 0 from Equation (1.9) should be positive.
As an alternative to GPA, I also consider separately a dummy for both engineer-
ing and science majors on the left-hand side. Panel A from Table 1.7 suggests that
the average inventors' GPA does not vary with graduating economic conditions,
and that the average inventors' tendency to major in engineering or science is un-
affected as well. To uncover the effect on the distribution of inventors' GPA, I also
estimate Equation (1.9) with a quantile regression. Figure 1-4 plots the coefficient
estimates with 95% confidence intervals for different quantiles. The estimates are
generally insignificant and close to zero. Taken together, Panel A from Table 1.7
and Figure 1-4 suggest that the initial unemployment rate does not affect which
graduates become inventors, at least in terms of their GPA and majors.
Since I find no evidence of changes at the extensive margin or in the nature
of sorting, at least the majority of the change in patent production is at the inten-
sive margin. Thus, there are no marginal inventors. But there are two types of
infra-marginal inventors: those that produce the marginal patents, and those un-
affected by initial economic conditions. As discussed in Section 1.2, there are two
possibilities:
1. Initial economic conditions do not affect a graduate's long-term occupational
affiliation, but graduating in a worse economy increases an individual's accu-
mulation of inventive human capital over time." In this case, I expect initial
economic conditions to have no effect on an inventor's sector.
2. Initial economic conditions change a graduate's long-term occupational af-
filiation. Graduating in a worse economy leads more graduates to work in
patent-producing sectors.
To test whether the change happens through the occupational choice channel, I
"For instance, by increasing graduate school enrollment.
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estimate the following equation using a Linear Probability Model at the inventor
level:
Pr(Fieldi = k) = Rj + 6(Controls)ij + e (1.10)
where Fieldi is the technology field in which inventor i patents the most, and
(Controls)i3 include linear and quadratic cohort graduation year trends as well
as individual characteristics." As an alternative measure of inventors' long-term
occupation, I use the sector of employment reported on Infinite Connection as of
June 2011. Panels B and C from Table 1.7 report the OLS estimates." None of
the estimates are statistically significant, suggesting that initial labor market con-
ditions do not affect inventors' long-term occupational affiliation." These results
suggest that the change in patent production is most likely caused by a change
in inventors' post-graduation human capital accumulation rather than their long-
term occupational choice.
As a robustness check, I also consider the effect of initial economic conditions
on the time it takes an inventor to produce her first patent after graduation. If
human capital accumulation is important, then one would expect inventors from
recession cohorts to patent sooner. In order to evaluate whether or not this is true,
I estimate the following equation by OLS:
T = OR3 + 6(Controls>)i + Ec. (1.11)
where T is the number of years between the first patent and the time of graduation.
In addition to the cohort trend and demographics, I also include dummies for the
4273% of the inventors patent in only one field.
43Logit and Multinomial Logit regressions produce very similar results.
"Since the classification of sectors is fairly coarse, it is possible that initial labor market condi-
tions change the inventors' sub-sector or firm. However, the differences in the mean level of patent
production should be much larger across the general sectors than within a sector.
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inventor's technology field to control for differences in the mean time to patent
across fields. Panel D from Table 1.7 reports the OLS estimates. 45 Columns (D1)
to (D3) show that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at the
time of graduation significantly decreases the time to the first patent by around 0.1
years. Given that the average of T is 7.95, the magnitude of the effect is very small.
Taken together, these results suggest that initial labor market conditions do
not affect inventors' long-term occupation. Thus, the most likely hypothesis is that
initial labor market conditions affect inventors' post-graduation human capital ac-
cumulation by affecting their initial career choices. For instance, a graduate may
go directly into graduate school in science or engineering if she graduates in a re-
cession, while in a boom she may initially work in a non-patent-producing sector
such as finance or management consulting. Even though she could end up being
an engineer in 10 years in both cases, in the former case she is likely to develop
more skills that are relevant for inventing. It is important to note that human capi-
tal accumulation could occur if an inventor starts her career in a patent-producing
sector such as high-technology, or goes directly to graduate school. Unfortunately,
without observing graduates' initial career choices, I cannot estimate the return to
going to graduate school (or starting in an inventive sector) in terms of increased
patent production.
1.5.2 Sorting
Inventors' Ability
The evidence suggests that initial economic conditions do not affect the prob-
ability of becoming an inventor in the first 15 years after graduation. Thus, to iden-
tify the nature of sorting, I compare the marginal patents to the average patents. I
45Quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson regressions have almost identical estimates.
50
estimate the following equation by OLS at the patent level:
(ability), = ORj + 6(j, j 2 ) + e7 . (1.12)
where ability is defined as in Equation (1.9). The key difference from before is that
Equation (1.12) is estimated at the patent level. One can think of the dependent vari-
able as the inventors' average ability weighted by how many patents they produce.
Thus 6 estimates the effect of initial economic conditions on the patent-weighted
average GPA. A negative 6 implies that the inventors who produce the marginal
patents have lower GPAs than the average inventors; a positive 6 suggests the op-
posite. Panel A from Table 1.8 shows that the national unemployment rate at the
time of graduation has no effect on the average patent-weighted GPA of the inven-
tors. Columns (A2) and (A3) suggest that the inventors who produce the marginal
inventions are more likely to be science majors and less likely to be engineering
majors.
Although there is no change in the average patent-weighted GPA, it is possi-
ble that there is a change in its distribution. Figure 1-5 presents two plots on the
distribution of patent-weighted GPA. The left panel of Figure 1-5 plots the coeffi-
cient estimates with 95% confidence intervals by quantile from a quantile regres-
sion of Equation (1.12). The positive coefficients at around the 20% quantile and the
negative coefficients around the 60%-80% suggest that a disproportionate share of
patents created by inventors graduating in a bad economy are from those with rel-
atively low GPAs. This is also consistent with the right panel of Figure 1-5, which
plots the kernel density of patent-weighted GPA separately for the cohorts above
and below the median initial unemployment rate (7%). The patents produced by
cohorts graduating in a bad economy are more likely to be from those inventors
with GPAs around or below the median (0.48). Hence, initial labor market condi-
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tions affect the patent production of the inventors with relatively low GPAs.46 But
inventors with the highest GPAs are unaffected. There are two explanations for
these findings. The first is that initial labor market conditions only affect the ini-
tial career choices of the inventors with lower GPAs. For example, it could be that
the students with the best GPAs go to graduate school regardless of the economic
conditions. The second possibility is that initial labor market conditions affect ev-
eryone's initial career choices, but initial career choices do not affect human capital
accumulation for the most able inventors.
Technology Field
Before analyzing the quality of the marginal patents, it is important to know
which technology fields they are from since the tendency to cite differs across
fields. 4 I examine the change in the distribution of technology field at the patent
level and estimate the following equation:
Pr(Fieldp = k) = 61 R j+ 02Rj * Sciencei + 6(Controls)p + Et (1.13)
which is similar to Equation (1.10) but estimated at the patent level. Since the
marginal patents are likely from science majors, I also interact Rj with an indica-
tor variable for being a science major, allowing the effect of graduating conditions
to differ for the science majors. I also control for a cohort graduation year trend,
an application year trend, and individual characteristics. Panel B from Table 1.8
reports the OLS estimates. An increase in the national unemployment rate at the
time of graduation does not have a significant effect on the technology field of the
46Notice that inventors on average have higher GPAs than non-inventors, so a relatively low
GPA for an inventor is still around the mean of the population (around 0).
47For instance, computer and communications patents on average receive significantly more
citations than mechanical patents.
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patents from the average inventors. But it does have a significantly different effect
on the technology field of the patents from inventors with science majors. In partic-
ular, the patents from science majors graduating in worse economic conditions are
more likely to be in the chemical, drugs and medical field.48 This is consistent with
the finding that the marginal patents are likely from science majors, who are also
more likely to patent in the chemical, drugs and medical field than engineering
majors (Table 1.3).
Citations
I measure the quality of a patent using the number of patent citations it re-
ceived by the end of 2010. I estimate the following equation at the patent level:
(Citations)p = a + ORj + 6(Controls) + c (1.14)
where I control for inventor characteristics, linear and quadratic cohort gradua-
tion year trends, dummies for technology field, and dummies for year of patent
application. Following the same logic as in Equation (1.12), 0 in Equation (1.14)
measures the change in the average quality of the patents as a result of a change in
the national unemployment rate in the year of graduation.49 A negative 0 implies
that the marginal patents have lower quality than the average patents.
The mean citations received in the overall sample is 17.72 and the median is
7. Since the distribution is skewed, I estimate Equation (1.14) using both OLS and
median regressions. Panel A from Table 1.9 reports the OLS estimates, which are
48There is a particular concern that software patents have negative externalities due to the patent
war in the industry. The results here suggest that the marginal patents are not software patents.49Note that it is possible though less likely for initial labor market conditions to influence the
quality of the patents without changing the number of patents produced by an inventor. This does
not affect the interpretation of the empirical results. One can just re-define the marginal patents
to be the ones whose existence as well as quality are affected by inventors' graduating economic
conditions.
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negative but insignificant. Panel B reports the estimates from median regressions,
in which the effect is negative and marginally significant. These results suggest
that initial economic conditions have no significant effect on the mean or median
quality of patents.
Similar to Figure 1-5, Figure 1-6 shows two plots on the distribution of cita-
tions. The left panel shows the coefficients from the quantile regression using the
specification in Column (B3). The coefficients are significantly negative between
the 55% and 85% quantile, suggesting that the quality of the marginal patents is
likely below the median. This is consistent with the right panel of Figure 1-6, which
plots the kernel density of the risk-adjusted citations. The risk-adjusted citations
are the residuals from regressing citations on the list of controls in Equation (1.14).
The residuals adjust for the effect of other covariates, such as application year, on
the distribution of citations. Based on the figure, it is clear that the quality of the
marginal patents is below the median and the mean. Together with Figure 1-5,
the results suggest that the marginal patents are of below median quality and are
produced by inventors with median ability.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore a novel channel through which short-term economic
fluctuations affect the long-run innovative output of the U.S. economy: college
graduates' initial career choices. Using a newly constructed data set on the patent-
ing history of MIT alumni, I find that cohorts graduating during economic down-
turns produce significantly more patents over the subsequent two decades. This
effect stems from initial career choices; economic fluctuations have no measurable
effect on the contemporaneous innovative output of graduates during their peak
inventive years. Graduating in bad economic conditions leads inventors to select
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career paths that help them accumulate more inventive human capital. Conse-
quently, they take less time to start producing patents, and produce more patents
over the 20 years after graduation. I show that the inventors who produce more
patents as a result of graduating in adverse labor market conditions are likely to
be science graduates who work in non-software-engineering sectors such as bio-
technology. My results also suggest that there exists positive sorting into invent-
ing: graduates who are ex ante more inventive are also more likely to self-select
into producing patents regardless of initial labor market conditions.
There are several promising directions for future research. Compared to the
average engineering and science student population, MIT graduates are expected
to have higher ability.50 On one hand, MIT graduates are potentially less sensitive
to labor market shocks if they have more skills (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). On the
other hand, they may also be more productive at innovating, so any small change
in their initial career choices could lead to relatively large changes in innovative
output. Thus, it is not clear whether my results would generalize to the average
college population. Studying the effect of initial labor market conditions on the
patent production of other populations of engineering and science students would
be a valuable extension. Second, since I do not directly observe initial career choice
or graduate school enrollment in my data, I cannot estimate the causal impact of
working in a certain sector or going to graduate school on long-term patent pro-
duction. Future work identifying the return (in terms of innovative output) to
different initial career choices would have important policy implications. Finally,
my results are not a welfare analysis of the impact of initial labor market condi-
tions. A comprehensive welfare analysis that accounts for wages as well as the
externalities of patented invention would be very informative.
50For instance, Grove (2011) shows that students accepted by MIT have higher SAT scores than
those accepted by public universities.
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Table 1.1: Mean Characteristics for Person-level Data
All Engineering Science Inventors
Proportion Female 0.319 0.267 0.398 0.152
Age at Graduation 22.58 22.621 22.376 22.56
GPA (Normalized) -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 0.214
Engineering 0.626 1 0 0.784
Science 0.245 0 1 0.177
Non-SE Majors 0.128 0 0 0.039
Ethnicity/Citizenship
White 0.584 0.577 0.627 0.676
Asian American 0.197 0.189 0.207 0.167
International 0.079 0.085 0.064 0.077
Other Minorities 0.140 0.149 0.102 0.080
High School Region
Northeast 0.406 0.393 0.427 0.421
Midwest 0.133 0.135 0.136 0.151
South 0.183 0.187 0.175 0.165
West 0.143 0.146 0.140 0.137
International 0.136 0.139 0.123 0.126
N 27,145 17,002 6,662 4,356
Currently Employed Sector
Tech. and Industrial 0.450 0.542 0.294 0.631
Academia 0.157 0.104 0.328 0.125
Non-SE 0.260 0.217 0.270 0.112
Unassigned 0.134 0.137 0.107 0.132
N 21,178 13,576 4,896 3,836
Notes: This table reports the mean of individual characteristics by person. An "in-
ventor" is anyone that has produced at least one patent since graduation. Currently
Employed Sector' is assigned from alumni's current employer as reported on Infinite
Connection in June 2011 (see Appendix 1.8.1); missing values are excluded.
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Table 1.2: Patent and Citation Statistics for Person*Year-Level Data
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: All Fields (N=475,636)
of Patents
of Citations
of Patents
of Citations
of Patents
of Citations
of Patents
of Citations
of Patents
of Citations
0.052 0.448 0 48
0.681 11.956 0 2557
Panel B: Engineering (N=303,506)
0.064 0.501 0 48
0.859 12.848 0 2095
Panel C: Science (N=114,593)
0.040 0.387 0 27
0.477 12.138 0 2557
Panel D: Non-SE (N=57,537)
0.012 0.191 0 14
0.144 4.119 0 500
Panel E: Inventors (N=89,435)
Num.
Num.
Num.
Num.
Num.
Num.
Num.
Num.
Num.
Num.
1.004
27.378
0
0
48
2557
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of the patents and citations at the
person*year level. Note that inventors could produce zero patents in some years
since they are defined as anyone with positive patent production since graduation.
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0.276
3.620
Table 1.3: Patents' Technology Fields By Inventors' Major
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Engineering
EECS 26.55% 12.61% 2.87% 1.26% 43.29%
Mechanical 3.95% 6.31% 4.84% 2.08% 17.17%
Chemical 0.93% 1.69% 3.27% 0.71% 6.60%
Material 0.67% 3.35% 1.18% 0.36% 5.57%
Aeronautics 1.76% 1.74% 1.03% 0.53% 5.07%
Other 0.41% 0.26% 0.21% 0.18% 1.05%
All Engineering 34.28% 25.95% 13.40% 5.12% 78.75%
Science
Physics 2.10% 3.89% 1.35% 0.20% 7.54%
Chemistry 0.47% 0.76% 2.88% 0.17% 4.28%
Mathematics 2.12% 0.58% 0.23% 0.10% 3.03%
Biology 0.60% 0.38% 1.65% 0.11% 2.74%
Other 0.43% 0.33% 0.01% 0.03% 0.79%
All Science 5.72% 5.94% 6.12% 0.60% 18.39%
Notes: This table reports the fraction of patents in a specific technology field pro-
duced with inventors with a specific major. Technology fields are compiled from
the six "Technology Categories" defined in Hall et al. (2001). The columns are: [1]
Computer & Communications; [2] Electrial & Electronic, Mechanical; [3] Chemi-
cal, Drugs & Medical; [4] Others; [5] Total. "Other" engineering majors include
Civil & Environmental; Ocean; and Nuclear. "Other" science majors include Brain
and Cognitive Sciences; Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sciences.
65
Table 1.4: Panel Estimates of the Impact of Graduating
duction (Dep.Var. = Num. of Patents, Mean = 0.052)
Conditions on Patent Pro-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unemployment Rate 0.100*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.044***
(0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Marginal Effect 0.105 0.058 0.054 0.045
2 Year Market Return 0.236 -0.244*** -0.263*** -0.105
(0.201) (0.074) (0.070) (0.082)
Marginal Effect 0.266 -0.216 -0.231 -0.100
Log (Fed R&D/GDP) No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Experience Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Current Year Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N 475,636 475,636 475,636 475,636 475,636 475,636 475,636
Notes: Person-year-level observation. All estimates are from quasi-maximum like-
lihood Poisson models. Sample includes all person-years from the year after grad-
uation to 2010 for the 1980-2005 cohorts. Robust standard errors clustered at the
cohort-year level are shown in parentheses. * : p < 0.10; ** : p < 0.05; *** : p < 0.01.
Dependent variable is the number of granted patents a graduate applies for in the
current year. Unemployment rate: the annual unemployment rate in the year of
graduation. 2 year market return: the CSRP market return during the sophomore
and junior years. Log (Fed R&D/GDP): the log of federal R&D expenditure as a
ratio of U.S. GDP in the year of graduation. Characteristics: include age, cumula-
tive GPA standardized by major and cohort, indicator variables for gender, race,
engineering or science student, high school region. Experience dummies: 0/1 indi-
cator variables for the difference between the current year and year of graduation.
Current year dummies: 0/1 indicator variables for the current year.
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Table 1.5: Panel Estimates of the Impact of Current Economic Conditions on Patent
Production (Dep.Var. = Num. of Patents)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R = Unemployment Rate R = Stock Return
Rj (Initial) 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.058*** -0.356*** -0.363*** -0.372***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095)
Rt (Current) -0.041 -0.074* -0.011 -0.082 -0.113 -0.112
(0.028) (0.040) (0.061) (0.120) (0.132) (0.178)
Rt_1 0.039 -0.068 0.040 -0.009
(0.038) (0.078) (0.164) (0.187)
Rt-2 0.074 0.060
(0.047) (0.163)
Log (Fed R&D/GDP) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current Year Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 198,804 178,990 160,228 198,804 178,990 160,228
Notes: Person-year-level observation. All estimates are from quasi-maximum like-
lihood Poisson models. Column (1) and (4) includes all person-years from two
years after graduation to 2000 for the 1980-1998 cohorts. Column (2) and (4) in-
cludes all person-years from three years after graduation to 2000 for the 1980-1997
cohorts. Column (3) and (6) includes all person-years from four years after grad-
uation to 2000 for the 1980-1996 cohorts. Robust standard errors clustered at the
cohort-year level are shown in parentheses.* : p < 0.10; ** : p < 0.05; *** : p < 0.01.
Dependent variable is the number of granted patents a graduate applies for in the
current year. R is the annual unemployment rate in the year of graduation or the
CSRP market return during the sophomore and junior years. Rt is the annual un-
employment rate in the current year or the CSRP market return in the two years
before. Log (Fed R&D/GDP): the log of federal R&D expenditure as a ratio of U.S.
GDP in the year of graduation. Characteristics: include age, cumulative GPA stan-
dardized by major and cohort, indicator variables for gender, race, engineering or
science student, high school region. Experience dummies: 0/1 indicator variables for
the difference between the current year and year of graduation. Current year trend
and cohort trend: current year variable and cohort variable.
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Table 1.6: Cross-sectional Estimates of the Impact of Graduating Conditions on
Entry into Invention
5 Years 10 Years 15 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment Rate 0.0017 0.0015 0.0024** 0.0022 0.0006 0.0004
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 16,610 16,610 16,610 16,610 16,610 16,610
Notes: Person-level observation. All estimates are from ordinary-least-squares
(OLS) models. Dependent variable is 0/1 indicator variable for becoming an in-
ventor in 5 years (Column (1) and (2)), 10 years (Column (3) and (4)), or 15 years
(Column (5) and (6)) after graduation. Sample includes all graduates from the
1980-1995 cohorts. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown
in parentheses. * : p < 0.10; ** : p < 0.05; *** : p < 0.01. Unemployment rate: the na-
tional unemployment rate in the year of graduation. Characteristics: include age,
cumulative GPA standardized by major and cohort, indicator variables for gender,
race, engineering or science student, high school region. Experience dummies: 0/1
indicator variables for the difference between the current year and year of gradua-
tion. Cohort trend: cohort variable and its square.
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Table 1.7: Cross-sectional Estimates of the Impact of Graduating Conditions on
Inventor Characteristics, Long-term Sector, and Time to First Patent
Panel A: Characteristics (N=2,828)
(Al) GPA (A2) Engineering (A3) Science
Unemployment Rate -0.0036 0.0064 -0.0032
(0.0143) (0.0100) (0.0071)
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Technology Field (N=2,828)
(B1) Computer & (B2) Electrical & Electronic; (B3) Chemical;
Communications Mechanical Drugs & Medical
Unemployment Rate 0.003 0.001 -0.005
(0.011) (0.008) (0.004)
Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Currently Employed Sector (N=2,538)
(Cl) Tech. & Industrial (C2) Academia (C3) Non-SE
Unemployment Rate 0.004 -0.007 -0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Time to First Paten (N=2,828)
(D1) (D2) (D3)
Unemployment Rate -0.109* -0.111** -0.105**
(0.052) (0.051) (0.048)
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Tech. Field Dummies No Yes Yes
Characteristics No No Yes
Notes: Person-level observation. All estimates are from ordinary-least-squares (OLS) models. Sam-
ple includes graduates from the 1980-1995 cohorts who have produced at least one patent in the
first 15 years after graduation. Dependent variable in Panel A is: GPA (Al), 0/1 indicator variable
for being an engineering major (A2) or science major (A3). Dependent variable in Panel B is 0/1
indicator variable for being in one of the three technology fields listed in the column names. Depen-
dent variable in Panel C is 0/1 indicator variable for being in one of the three currently employed
sectors listed in the column names. Dependent variable in Panel D is the number of years between
the year of graduation and the year of application for the first granted patent. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the cohort level are shown in parentheses. * : p < 0.10; ** : p < 0.05; *** : p < 0.01.
Technology field:the technology field in which the inventors patent the most. Currently employed sec-
tor: assigned from the current employer reported on Infinite Connection as of June 2011; missing
values are excluded. Time to First Patent': the number of years between year of graduation and year
of patent application for the first granted patent. Unemployment rate: the national unemployment
rate in the year of graduation. Characteristics: include age, cumulative GPA standardized by major
and cohort, indicator variables for gender, race, engineering or science student, high school region.
Cohort trend: cohort variable and its square.
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Table 1.8: Cross-sectional Estimates of the Impact of Graduating Conditions on
Patent Characteristics
Panel A: Inventor Characteristics
(Al) GPA (A2) Engineering (A3) Science
Unemployment Rate 0.0061 -0.0107 0.0120
(0.0198) (0.0103) (0.0078)
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Technology Field
(B1) Computer & (B2) Electrical (B3) Chemical;
Communications & Electronic; Mechanical Drugs & Medical
Unemployment Rate 0.006 0.005 -0.012
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
Unemployment*Science -0.031 0.002 0.034***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.011)
Inventor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Application Year Trend Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Patent-level observation (N=13,336). All estimates are from ordinary-least-
squares (OLS) models. Sample includes all patents produced by the 1980-1995 co-
horts in the first 15 years after graduation. Dependent variable in Panel A is: GPA
(Al), 0/1 indicator variable for being an engineering major (A2) or science major
(A3). Dependent variable in Panel B is 0/1 indicator variable for being in one of the
three technology fields listed in the column names. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the cohort level are shown in parentheses. * : p < 0.10; ** : p < 0.05; *** :
p < 0.01. Unemployment rate: the national unemployment rate in the year of grad-
uation. Unemployment*Science: the interaction term of "unemployment rate" and
the 0/1 indicator variable for being a science major. Inventor Characteristics: in-
clude age, cumulative GPA standardized by major and cohort, indicator variables
for gender, race, engineering or science student, high school region. Cohort trend:
cohort variable and its square. Application year trend: application year variable and
its square.
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Table 1.9: Cross-sectional Estimates
Patent Citations
of the Impact of Graduating Conditions on
Panel A: OLS
(C1) (C2) (C3)
Unemployment Rate -0.202 -0.672 -0.655
(0.694) (0.442) (0.415)
Application Year Dummies No Yes Yes
Technology Field Dummies No Yes Yes
Inventor Characteristics No No Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Median Regression
(D1) (D2) (D3)
Unemployment Rate -0.273 0.001 -0.139
(0.182) (0.084) (0.086)
Application Year Dummies No Yes Yes
Technology Field Dummies No Yes Yes
Inventor Characteristics No No Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Patent-level observation (N=13,336). Estimates in Panel A are from
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) models. Estimates in Panel B are from quantile re-
gressions estimated at the median. Sample includes all patents produced by the
1980-1995 cohorts in the first 15 years after graduation. Dependent variable is the
number of citations received by the end of 2010. Robust standard errors clustered
at the cohort level are shown in parentheses.* : p < 0.10; ** : p < 0.05; *** : p < 0.01.
Unemployment rate: the national unemployment rate in the year of graduation. In-
ventor Characteristics: include age, cumulative GPA standardized by major and
cohort, indicator variables for gender, race, engineering or science student, high
school region. Cohort trend: cohort variable and its square. Application year dum-
mies: the set of 0/1 indicator variables for each application year. Technology field
dummies: the set of 0/1 indicator variables for each technology field.
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Figure 1-1: By Year: Average Patents and Citations Per Person
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Notes: This figure plots the average patent output in the each year, by year since graduation (on the left) and year of
patent application (on the right).
Figure 1-2: Classes of 1983 VS 1984: Patent Output by Year
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Notes: Outcome plotted is, by year since graduation, the average patent output in the each year(on the left) and the
average citations received for patents produced in that year (on the right). The black line is Class of 1983, and the red
dashed line is Class of 1984.
0
a
0*
0 30
.. I .............. ......... ....  .. .. ..... ...................
Figure 1-3: Persistent Effects of Graduating Conditions on Patent Output
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Notes: Person*year-level observation. These figures plot the coefficient estimates and confidence interval of the inter-
action term between the shock and the dummy for each year since graduation from a quasi-ML Poisson model. Dep.
Variable = Number of patents produced in a year. On the left: shock measured by unemployment rate in the year of
graduation. On the right: shock measured by the stock return during the sophomore and junior years.
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Figure 1-4: Balanced Panel: Initial Conditions And Inventors' GPAt
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Notes: Person-level observation. This figure plots the coefficient estimates and
95% CI from the Quantile regression. Dep. Var. = GPA. Independent variable
plotted: national unemployment rate in the year of graduation. Standard errors
are bootstrapped with 2000 repetitions. Sample includes all the individuals from
the 1980-1995 cohorts that have produced at least one patent within 15 years after
graduation.
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Figure 1-5: Balanced Panel: Initial Conditions and Patent-Weighted Inventors' GPA
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Notes: Patent-level observation. Sample includes all the patents produced by the 1980-1995 cohorts within 15 years
after graduation. On the left: the coefficient estimates from the Quantile regression. Dependent variable is the (patent-
weighted) GPA of the inventor. Independent variable plotted: national unemployment rate in the year of graduation.
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 2000 repetitions. On the right: the kernel density of inventor's GPA. Black line:
the sample of patents produced by the inventors who graduated with the national unemployment higher than 7%. Red
dashed line: the sample of patents produced by the inventors who graduated with the national unemployment rate
lower than 7%. The two gray vertical lines are the mean and median of the whole sample.
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Figure 1-6: Balanced Panel: Initial Conditions and the Distribution of Citationst
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(B) Kernel density of Residual Citations
Notes: Patent-level observation. Sample includes all the patents produced by the 1980-1995 cohorts within 15 years af-
ter graduation. On the left: the coefficient estimates from the Quantile regression. Dependent variable is the number
of citations. Independent variable plotted: national unemployment rate in the year of graduation. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 2000 repetitions. On the right: the kernel density of residual citations. Residual citations are the resid-
uals from regressing citations on cohort trend, inventor characteristics, application year dummies and technology field
dummies. Black line: the sample of patents produced by the inventors who graduated with the national unemployment
higher than 7%. Red dashed line: the sample of patents produced by the inventors who graduated with the national
unemployment rate lower than 7%. The two gray vertical lines are the mean and median of the whole sample.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Assigning Sector based on Employer
Based on the employer reported on Infinite Connection, I assign the gradu-
ates to three sectors: technology and industrial (anything that generally involves
patent production); academia; and non-science and non-engineering ("non-SE",
including finance, consulting, law, real estate, and government). I determine the
sector in two ways. The first is by firm. For instance, Google is in the first group
whereas Goldman Sachs is in the third group. However, this is only plausible
for large firms. Since the graduates work for a very wide range of firms (more
than 10,000 unique names), it would be too time consuming to go through all the
firms and determine their sectors. Thus, the second way to assign sector is based
on keywords. For instance, any firm with "semiconductors" or "pharma" in its
names is assigned to the first group; any employer with "university" or "college"
is assigned to the second group; any firm with "holding" or "consult" is assigned
to the third group. Although doing so inevitably allows more measurement errors
than assigning sector by firm, it is more efficient and covers most of the sample.
Only 13% of the reported employers are unassigned. They are generally small
firms such as start-ups.
Samples of keywords used to identify each sector are:
1. Technology & Industrial: tech machine syst dynamics scien research commu-
nication devic wire manufact telecom syst soft defense instrument engineer
space material equipment aircraft energ motor electr industri robot network
chemical conduct comput auto mobile product info elevat data design media
petro oil engrg solution innovat power metal analysis utilit diagnosti metric
engine digita activ internet intranet atomic aviation cemex cement oceano-
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graph analyt telegraph nuclear pharma therapeut molecu biomed cure can-
cer;
2. Academia: universi college "medical school" "business school;"
3. Non-SE: consult capital trading asset invest securitie bank venture finance
financial wealth holding fund insurance broker architect hotel society foun-
dation entertain picture embassy community school academy ministry teach
healthcare airline propert program practice clinic attorney realestate market-
ing adverti realty.
1.8.2 Patent Matching
My matching procedure has two steps. In the first step, I match the alumni to
the inventors that have the same first and last names, and drop those with different
non-missing middle names or initials. It is possible that this first step could drop
a small set of patents produced by the alumni, if a) the names are misspelled on
the patent grants, or b) the alumni use new names on the patents but have not
reported the name change to the Alumni Association.
In the second step, I assign each alumnus-inventor pair an integer score out of
10 based on a) how well the middle names match, b) how well the locations match,
and c) how rare the first and/or last names are. Table A1.1 provies a summary of
the score assignment. In the middle score category, the full score, 3, is when the full
middle names, including when there are no middle names, are matched between
the alumnus and the inventor. A score of 2 is when the initials match or when
the middle name is missing for the inventors but not the alumni. Since it is not
required for inventors to report their full names, not having a middle name listed
on the patent does not imply there is no middle name. A score of 1 is when the
79
middle name is missing for the alumnus but not the inventor. It is less likely but
still possible that some alumni do not report their middle names to the Registrar's
Office and the Alumni Association. It is also possible that the alumnus has added a
middle name since graduation and listed it on the patents. In the location category,
the full score, 4, is when one of the work or home city-level addresses reported by
the alumnus perfectly matches the city of the inventor. 3 is when the states match,
and 1 is when the countries match. In the name rarity category, there are two
sub-criteria: how rare the names are among the MIT population (full score 2), and
how rare the names are among the inventors population (full score 1). On the first
criterion, the full score 2 is when the first or last name is very rare (less than 10
people with the same first or last name); 1 is when the first or last name is fairly
rare (less than 100 people with the same first or last name); the rest are 0. On the
second criterion, 1 is when there are less than 15 unique inventors with the same
first and last name, and 0 otherwise.
A higher score implies a greater likelihood that the matching is correct. For
example, an alumnus-inventor pair scores 10 when the graduate and the inventor
have a rare first or last name and are exactly matched on middle name and city
of residence. A score of 3 means the two have common names, live in different
states, and the middle name is missing in the alumni records. Since an inventor
may provide different information across patents, the matching score could also
differ across patents. In this case I use the highest score for each alumnus-inventor
pair. In the very few cases where two alumni are matched to the same inventor,
I look both up on Google or Linkedln and determine the correct match based on
their years of graduation and where they have worked.
The matching score is not a perfect criteria due to obvious data limitations.
If an alumni inventor has moved many times, then the location match would not
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be perfect. On the other hand, even within a city, there are people with the same
names. A score lower than 6 means the alumnus-inventor pair fails to fully sat-
isfy at least two out of the three criteria listed above. In this case, it is hard to
distinguish whether the low score is from not observing the correct address or the
match is a false positive. A score above 8 means that the alumnus-inventor pair is
a perfect match by multiple criteria, but not all the correctly matched pairs would
score this high. Thus, scores that are sufficiently low should be dropped, but there
is a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. I use 6 as the main threshold to
gain more statistical power in my analysis, but I also use 8 as a robustness check.
After dropping all the pairs that score below 6, the final sample includes over 4,500
alumni inventors with more than 25,000 total patents granted by the end of 2010.
These patents have received over 300,000 citations in total by the end of 2010. Re-
stricting to those scoring above 8 still leaves over 3,400 alumni and 19,300 patents
with nearly 250,000 citations. I exclude all the patents that were applied for before
and during the year of graduation. Figure (A1.1) shows that the variations in the
cohort-level patent production do not depend on the score. 51
siSince the later cohorts have less time to invent, there is a natural downward slope in both
patent and citation output.
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1.8.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1.1: Assigning Matching Score
Strong Medium Weak
Middle Name [3] Exact match [2] Initial; Inventor missing [1] Alumnus missing
Location [4] City [3] State [1] Country
Name Rarity [3] Very rare [2] Rare [1] or [0] Not rare
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Table A1.2: Mean Characteristics of Classes of 1983 and 1984t
Class 1983 1984
Female 0.2091 0.215
Age at Graduation 22.677 22.576
Inventor 0.251 0.251
Ethnicity/Citizenship
White 0.797 0.773
Asian Am. 0.044** 0.068
Other Minorities (US) 0.092 0.073
International 0.068 0.086
Highschool Region
Northeast 0.504* 0.465
Midwest 0.137 0.127
South 0.151 0.146
West 0.101 0.112
International 0.108*** 0.151
Field of Study
Engineering 0.683 0.701
Science 0.208 0.223
Non-SE 0.109** 0.077
N (Person) 1033 1065
Current Sector
Tech. and Industrial 0.520 0.500
Academia 0.131* 0.161
Non-SE 0.186 0.202
Unassigned 0.163 0.138
N (Person) 861 908
Notes: Statistical significance reported for the T-test of equal means. *p <
0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table A1.3: Baseline Coefficient Estimates: Characteristics
Female
Age at Graduation
Engineering
Science
GPA*Engineering
GPA*Science
GPA (Non-SE)
-1.129***
(0.044)
-0.022***
(0.008)
1.431***
(0.072)
1.042***
(0.075)
0.378***
(0.068)
0.339***
(0.069)
-0.043
Asian American
International
Other Minorities
HS Midwest
HS South
HS West
HS International
Notes: Coefficients reported from Column (7) of Table 1.4. Base groups are: non-
SE; white; northeast highschool. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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0.199***
(0.041)
-0.083*
(0.047)
-0.380***
(0.058)
0.063
(0.042)
-0.100***
(0.035)
-0.055
(0.035)
0.068*
(0.041)
Table A1.4: Robustness Checks: The Impact of Graduating Conditions on Patent
Production
Panel A: OLS & 2SLS
OLS 2SLS
(Al) (A2) (A3) (A4)
Unemployment Rate 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
2 Year Market Return -0.015*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.005)
N 475,636 475,636 475,636 475,636
Panel B: Balanced Panel
Sample I Sample II
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4)
Unemployment Rate 0.042*** 0.069***
(0.014) (0.018)
2 Year Market Return -0.436*** -0.410***
(0.085) (0.124)
N 249,150 249,150 182,710 182,710
Panel C: Excluding Top Inventors
Dependent: (Pat>0) Top Inventors Excluded
(Cl) (C2) (C3) (C4)
Unemployment Rate 0.039*** 0.060***
(0.008) (0.009)
2 Year Market Return -0.129*** -0.309***
(0.053) (0.082)
N 474,588 474,588 474,763 474,763
Notes: Person-year-level observations. Dependent variable is number of patents produced in a
year except for (Cl) and (C2). Robust standard errors are corrected clustered at the cohort-year
level are shown in parentheses. * : p < 0.10; ** : p < 0.05; *** : p < 0.01. Panel A: Estimates in
(Al) and (A2) are from ordinary-least-squares (OLS) models. Estimates in (A3) and (A4) are from
two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) models. Sample includes the 1980-2005 cohorts observed for years
between the year after graduation and 2010. Panel B: Estimates are from quasi-maximum likeli-
hood (QML) Poisson models. Sample I includes 1980-1995 cohorts observed for the first 15 years
after graduation; Sample II includes 1980-1995 cohorts observed between 2000 and 2010. Panel C:
Estimates in (Cl) and (C2) are from Logistic regressions. Estimates in (C3) and (C4) are from QML
Poisson models. Dependent variable in (Cl) and (C2) is 0/1 indicator variable for positive patent
production. Sample in (C3) and (C4) excludes the most productive inventors with more than 50
lifetime patents. Unemployment rate: the annual unemployment rate in the year of graduation. 2
year market return: the CSRP market return during the sophomore and junior years. All the regres-
sions include the following controls: the log of federal R&D expenditure as a ratio of U.S. GDP in
the year of graduation; age, cumulative GPA standardized by major and cohort, indicator variables
for gender, race, engineering or science student, high school region; 0/1 indicator variables for the
difference between the current year and year of graduation; and 0/1 indicator variables for the
current year.
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Table A1.5: Robustness Checks: The Impact of Graduating Conditions on Selection
into Majors
Dependent Engineering=1 Science=1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 27,145 27,145 27,145 27,145
Notes: Person-level observations. Coefficients reported are marginal effects from
Logistic models. Dependent variable is 0/1 indicator variable for being an engi-
neering major ((1) and (2)) or science major ((3) and (4)). Robust standard errors are
corrected clustered at the cohort level are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p <
0.05; ***p < 0.01. Unemployment rate: the annual unemployment rate in the year
of graduation. Characteristics: include age, cumulative GPA standardized by ma-
jor and cohort, indicator variables for gender, race, engineering or science student,
high school region. Cohort trend: cohort variable.
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Figure A1.1: Average Patent Output by Cohort
LO
LO
C1
I I 1 7
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Graduating Class
Matching Score>=6 Matching Score>=8
Patent
Notes: This figure plots, by cohort, the number of patents produced per person
since the year after graduation.
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Chapter 2
Self-Selection into Finance and
Implications for Talent Allocationi
2.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, the wage gap between financiers and engineers in
the Current Population Surveys has grown from less than 5% to over 30% (Philip-
pon and Reshef, 2009). Today, finance has become one of the industries with the
highest earnings potential.2 It is thus not surprising that the proportion of bach-
elor's graduates who became financiers has grown steadily at elite schools such
as MIT and Harvard (Figure A2.1; Goldin and Katz, 2008). Before the onset of
11 thank David Autor, Daron Acemoglu, and Scott Stern for their generous support and guid-
ance on this project. Pierre Azoulay, Panle Barwick, Mihir Desai, JB Doyle, Michael Greenstone,
John S. Reed, Attoinette Schoar, Jialan Wang, Heidi Williams, and numerous seminar participants
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard Business School have provided helpful
comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Suzanne Berger, Maggy Bruzelius, Claude Canizares,
Daniel Hastings, Elizabeth Hicks, Deborah Liverman, Brendon Puffer, Joseph Recchio, Ri Romano,
Stuart Schmill, Lydia Snover, Ingrid Vargas, and especially Gregory Harris for help with data col-
lection. This project was supported by the Kauffman Foundation. All errors are my own.
2Oyer (2008) shows that for Stanford MBA graduates, the expected difference in cumulative
income between investment bankers and non-financiers is millions of dollars during the first 20
years after graduation. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) find that in 2004 the top-25 hedge fund managers
together earned more than all of the CEOs of Standard & Poor's 500 companies combined.
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the recent financial crisis in 2008, finance was attracting between 20% and 40% of
top college graduates who entered the labor force (Hastings et al., 2010; Rampell,
2011).
To some, the raising popularity of finance is disconcerting, as the high wages
in finance might be luring away young talent from sectors where they would have
produced more value to society. For example, Kedrosky and Stangler (2011) make
the alarming observation that the increase in financial employment over the last
several decades parallels the decline in new firm founding activities in America.
Wadhwa (2011) articulates the concern that engineering students are increasingly
likely to choose a career in finance over engineering. Macroeconomic theory sug-
gests that talent allocation is strongly responsive to a society's reward structure
and that allocating talent from productive to rent-seeking activities hurts economic
growth (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991; Acemoglu, 1995).3 However, there ex-
ists little empirical work on whether financiers would have been productive en-
gineers, scientists, or entrepreneurs in a counterfactual world with low relative
wages in finance.
Using data on MIT bachelor's graduates between 2006 and 2010, I provide
some of the first empirical evidence on talented college graduates' self-selection
into different career paths. I find that finance and graduate school are the main
competitors for the students with the most observed academic talent and skills
coming out of MIT. At the time of college entrance, students with higher raw aca-
demic talent are only slightly more likely to go to graduate school after graduation
than go into finance. However, at the time of graduation, students who enter grad-
3The existing literature has not reached a consensus on whether the recent rise in financial
wages represents booming productivity or increasing opportunities in rent seeking. For example,
Philippon and Reshef (2009) argue that the financial deregulation of the early 1980s has driven the
increase in skill intensity and thus wages in finance. In contrast, Bolton et al. (2011) suggest that the
growth of information technology has lowered the costs of exchanging financial information and
has allowed financiers to extract more rents.
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uate school have much higher grade point averages (GPAs), in both magnitude
and statistical significance, than those who enter finance, especially among the en-
gineering and science majors. This suggests that students with different career
paths in mind specialize in developing different skills during college. Students
who aspire to go to graduate school are likely to focus on developing academic
skills and their efforts are reflected in their GPAs. In contrast, students who are in-
terested in finance may spend time practicing skills that are not captured by GPAs
(e.g., social skills such as networking and communications). As a result, the two
populations do not appear to be substitutable in their skills when they graduate
from MIT.
To understand the nature of the self-selection into finance, I analyze the im-
pact of the recent financial crisis, which exogenously and dramatically decreased
the proportion of financiers in the 2009 and 2010 cohorts. I show that when finance
is no longer a viable option, the most likely alternative career for financiers with
engineering and science degrees is graduate school. Under the assumption that
entry-level base salaries in finance are sticky, I use the crisis as an instrument to
estimate the return to having higher academic talent and skills. Although hav-
ing greater academic talent is positively and significantly associated with a higher
wage in finance, additional academic skills learned in engineering and science
coursework are not rewarded. Marginal financiers, who did not enter finance be-
cause of the crisis, have significantly lower base salaries than average financiers.
These results suggest that students who enter finance are positively sorted based
on their skills as valued in finance, but it is unclear whether finance and science
and engineering graduate programs value the same set of the skills. Furthermore,
limiting the number of entry-level jobs in finance in the case of a financial crisis
does not make the sector less attractive to graduates but, rather, makes it more
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competitive.
Few studies analyze the sorting of college graduates into different initial ca-
reers or majors based on ability, despite the vast literature that has established
the importance of self-selection in understanding various labor market outcomes
such as labor force participation, educational attainment, and immigration (Heck-
man, 1979; Willis and Rosen, 1979; Borjas, 1987; Heckman and Honore, 1990; Ar-
cidiacono, 2004; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008; Bayer et al., 2011; Maurel and
D'Haultfoeuille, 2011; Boehm and Watzinger, 2011).4 Arcidiacono (2004) finds
large differences in ability sorting across majors that cannot be explained by earn-
ings premiums, which he attributes to unobserved preferences. Turner and Bowen
(1999) show that ability sorting based on SAT scores can only explain a small part
of the growing gender gap in choices of majors. Compared to previous studies, I
focus on a relatively homogeneous sample, MIT bachelor's graduates. This allows
me to observe refined measures of academic talent and skills with approximately
uniform scales. My results are likely informative for other top engineering and
science undergraduate programs, but they may not be generalizable to the entire
engineering and science population.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses my con-
ceptual framework in the context of a modified Roy model. Section 2.3 describes
the data and summary statistics. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the empirical strategy
and results, respectively. Sector 2.6 concludes the paper.
4Previous studies on college graduates' choices of majors and careers have mostly focused on
the impact of monetary incentives. They find that students' choices are sensitive to potential future
payoffs (Berger, 1988; Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Ryoo and Rosen, 2004; Majumdar and Shimotsu,
2006; Boudarbat, 2008).
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2.2 Conceptual Framework
Based on the intuition developed in Roy (1951), individuals self-select into
the sector with the highest potential payoff. While financiers are likely to possess
the skills valued in finance, they may not necessarily have the potential or ability
to become successful engineers or scientists. In a static framework without skill
development, this would be the case where financiers do not have the innate talent
for science and engineering. However, in a dynamic framework it is also possible
that financiers choose not to develop engineering and science skills even if they
have the potential to do so. This section first formalizes this intuition in a two-
period Roy-style model for skill development and career choice. It then discusses
its implications and extensions for empirical analysis.
2.2.1 A Modified Roy Model
Model Set-up
I consider a two-period Roy-style model with two sectors and two skills in
which individuals choose which skill to develop based on the sector they would
like to enter in the future. I denote the two sectors "SE" for Science and Engineer-
ing and "F" for Finance. Each sector values a different skill, denoted hSE or hF.
In the first period, individua li chooses to allocate time between developing skills
subject to
1. 1.1= -hE + -i,
where - and } are the individual costs of developing hSE and hF, respectively.aI o
In the second period, individual i chooses which sector to enter based on the
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payoffs to his or her skills:
WE=kSEh'sE; WE- kFh' + x1,WS E ES ;F F
where WSE and WF are wages inclusive of non-pecuniary preferences, kSE and kF
are the returns to skills, and i is a preference parameter that captures the taste
differential between the two sectors without loss of generality. Let k - L.
Proposition 2.2.1. Individual i develops hiE = i and enters sector SE if and only if
ac ;> k pi+ 1-. Otherwise, individual i develops h' = Oi and enters sector F.
Proof. The maximal payoff to individual i for entering sector SE is kSEai and the
maximal payoff for entering F is kFi + Xi- Since there is no uncertainty, individual
i simultaneously chooses which skill to develop and which sector to enter based
on the higher payoff.
Since each sector only values one skill in the model, an individual would not
develop both skills. Thus, individuals with high potential payoffs (a) in SE do
not necessarily end up with a high hSE- If their payoff for going into Finance is
higher, they would choose to develop hF instead. Conceptually, a and / represent
the potential talent in each sector, while hSE and hF are the observed skills.
Self-Selection of Talent
It follows directly from Proposition 2.2.1 that the average observed hSE Of
individuals going into F is lower than that of those going into SE. However, this
does not imply that the financiers would not have been productive workers in
sector SE in the absence of sector F, as they would have followed a different path
of skill development. To study sorting into finance, I compare individuals based
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on their raw talents instead of observed skills.
assumption to derive an explicit expression:
(7)
I make the following normality
PUO,07,3 0a3
I also assume that xi = x is constant across individuals so that the focus is on
sorting based on ability. Let Xk =
Proposition 2.2.2. E [a| SE] > E [a IF] if and only if p <
Proof. We have
E [a|SE] = E [ailai - k3i > Xk] = pa + paoaA( PO_-_Xk
O'0
and
E [aIF] = E [aijai - k3i < Xk] = p, - paoo-aA(- /to - Xk
o
where ai - k#4 ~ N (po, o ) and poo = corr(ai, ai - k~i).
Thus, E [a|ISE) > E [aIF] if and only if pQo > 0 and
Pao > 0 * cov(ai, ai - k3) = U2 - kpuu, > 0 < p < .7,
ko-3'
D
Proposition 2.2.3. E [# |F] > E [# SE] if and only if p < - .
Proof. We have
E [O|S E ] = E [ ijai - koi ;> xk| = p, + p3oo- A( /0o - XkU~O
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pY a
and
E [ |F] = E [ jjaj - k3 < Xk] = p,3 - ppoap( - Xk)
UO
where p,3 = corr(o, a - k13).
Thus, E [#|F] > E [#|ISE] if and only if ppo < 0 and
k'aPlo < 0 e cov(pi,acj - k/i) = pap- kai <~ 0 ep <  .
Proposition 2.2.2 shows that whether individuals who enter sector SE have
above average talent in SE depends on the correlation between the two types of
talent. When this correlation is sufficiently low, finance does not attract the top
talent away from engineering and science. I call this "positive sorting in SE." Sim-
ilarly, Proposition 2.2.3 shows that positive sorting in sector F, where the average
individuals entering F have greater talent in F than the average individuals enter-
ing SE, also occurs when the correlation between the two talents is sufficiently low.
Thus, we have three scenarios:
1. Positive sortings in both sectors, where the better financial talent enters sector
F and the better SE talent enters sector SE: p < min ( , k 3 ).
2. Positive sorting in SE but not in F, where the better of both talents enter sector
SE: p > k" and 0a > kap3.
3. Positive sorting in F but not in SE, where the better of both talents enter sector
F: p > 0 and oa < kufi.
Note that it is impossible to have negative sortings in both sectors since that re-
quires p > max (7, ;) > 1. Scenarios 2 and 3 suggest that when the correlation
between the two types of talent is high, positive sorting occurs in the sector with
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the higher return to skill (measured by o, and ko). Following the same deriva-
tion, one can show that if zi varies across individuals, then sorting would depend
on the correlation between talent in SE and a combination of talent in F and taste.
For instance, if a and -XZ are proportional, that is, individuals with high a also
have a strong preference for sector SE, then even when the correlation between the
two types of talent is high, the best talent in SE may still go into SE instead of F.
2.2.2 Interpreting the Model in the Empirical Context
Empirically, the first period of the model corresponds to the four years during
college when students take courses, participate in different activities, and develop
a set of hard analytical skills as well as soft social skills. The second period cor-
responds to the years after graduation when students enter graduate school or
different sectors in the labor market. In the previous section my model makes sev-
eral simplifying assumptions. First, individuals may not always stay in the same
sector. In contrast, Chapter 1 considers a model where some individuals have in-
centive to switch sectors. Here, however, one can think of the wages in the model
as the life-time utility, inclusive of non-pecuniary returns, of career paths with dif-
ferent starting points. Thus, this assumption is without loss of generality for the
purposes of this chapter. Second, there is no uncertainty in the model, but indi-
viduals may learn more about their talents and preferences over time. Third, the
skills valued in different sectors are not one dimensional and are likely to include
an array of hard and soft skills. Financiers are unlikely to have zero skills relevant
to working in the science and engineering sectors as predicted in the model. Fi-
nally, one could generalize the model to multiple sectors. However, none of these
limitations affects the key intuitions derived from the model as long as the finan-
cial sector values a different set of skills from the science and engineering sectors
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and individuals do not randomly develop their skills. In particular, it remains true
that individuals with different career paths in mind would develop different sets
of skills during college and that those entering the science and engineering sec-
tors are more suited to do so than financiers at the time of graduation, though not
necessarily in terms of their potential talent.
The rise of finance manifests in the model in two ways. First, as the earnings
of financiers grow, the return to skill in finance increases, which is equivalent to
an increase in k. Thus, holding tastes constant, more students would choose to
develop finance-related skills and would enter finance as a result of the increased
expected payoff in that sector. This is the "size effect," which is even larger if there
is also a growing taste for finance, for example, as finance is increasingly perceived
as more prestigious. Moreover, as Propositions 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 show, k also affects
sorting in both sectors. An increase in k would decrease the degree of positive sort-
ing into the SE sector, change the sorting from positive or negative, or increase the
degree of negative sorting.5 Increasing k would also affect the degree of sorting in
the F sector in the opposite way. These are the "sorting effects." Second, Philippon
and Reshef (2009) argue that there is increasing demand in finance for quantitative
and analytical skills that are traditionally valued in the engineering and science
sectors. This is equivalent to an increase in p and decreases the likelihood of posi-
tive sortings in both sectors.
2.2.3 Using the Financial Crisis to Identify Sorting
One can think of a and #+:Xk as the potential payoffs in SE and F, respectively,
inclusive of preferences. Thus, the correlation between the two payoffs, which
determines the sorting of talent into finance, depends on two factors: how skills
5Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) make a similar observation in the context of women's labor
force participation.
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are valued in each sector and how individual preferences correlate with skills. Both
of these are ultimately empirical questions.
My data provide measures of raw academic talent, academic skills developed
in college, and wages in finance. In the following empirical sections, I first show
how financiers differ from others in their observed talent and skills. I then use
fluctuations in the stock market, which are driven in my sample primarily by the
recent financial crisis, to identify how academic talent and skills are valued by the
financial sector in terms of base salaries. I make two identifying assumptions. First,
the financial crisis is a negative and exogenous shock to the number of entry-level
positions available in the financial sector. Second, the base salaries of entry-level
positions in finance are sticky, so the crisis only affects observed salaries by chang-
ing the composition of financiers. Given these assumptions, I can estimate the
wage equation in the financial sector using a Heckman selection model in which
stock returns are an instrument. Furthermore, I follow the methodology in Gru-
ber et al. (1999) and Chandra and Staiger (2007) and compare the characteristics of
marginal financiers, whose entry into finance is sensitive to market conditions, to
those of average financiers.
Since my measures of talent and initial wages are only available for recent
cohorts, I cannot study the change in the nature of sorting into finance over the
last several decades. However, the model suggests that my results should provide
a lower (upper) bound for the degree of positive (negative) sorting in the science
and engineering sectors for the earlier cohorts. In addition, I observe the choices of
majors for the earlier cohorts. Consistent with the model, I show in the Appendix
that a size effect exists, that is, an increasing tendency to major in finance-related
fields (i.e., economics and management), controlling for demographics.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Sample
In collaboration with the Institutional Research section of MIT's Office of the
Provost, I collected data on gender, ethnicity, and high school state, as well as edu-
cational information such as major(s) and cumulative GPA, for all graduates who
received a bachelor's degree from MIT between 1980 and 2010.6 Based on their
majors, I group graduates into three fields of study: economics and management,
engineering and science, and others.7
My analysis focuses on the classes of 2006-2010, whose initial career choices
and salaries are given in the Graduating Student Surveys (GSS) from the MIT Ca-
reers Office.8 I determine the initial sector of employment based on post-graduation
plans and employers. I classify the graduates into five sectors: 1) finance, 2) con-
sulting, 3) technology and industrial,9 4) graduate school, and 5) other (e.g., law,
real estate, and travel).10 Only a sub-sample of the bachelor's graduates have valid
employer or graduate school information that I can use to determine their sector,
and the total response rate is approximately 64%.11 For this sample, I also observe
the amount of financial aid received in one's senior year, adjusted for inflation and
used as a control for family income.
I rely on two sets of measures for ability and skills. First, the admission nu-
6My data come from various offices at MIT, and Table A2.1 provides an overview of the vari-
ables and their sources.
7For students with two majors, around 10% of the sample, I assign the major first declared as
the primary major. See the Appendix for the lists of majors assigned to each field.
8The GSSs started in 1999 but had no individual identifiers before 2006.
9The technology and industrial category includes research assistant positions in universities
and institutes.
'
0See the Appendix for more details.
"MIT grants degrees in June, September, and February. The survey is only for June graduates,
which comprises the vast majority of the students. The response rate is calculated based on all
graduates.
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meric index provides a proxy for a student's raw academic ability before enter-
ing MIT.12 Based on college applications, the index score is a weighted average of
objective measures such as standardized test scores, high school grades, and the
difficulty of high school courses. It does not measure subjective qualities or soft
skills. I normalize the admission index within each cohort so the reported statis-
tics are measured in standard deviations from the cohort means. Second, the field
of study at MIT and the cumulative GPA measure the field-specific skills devel-
oped at MIT. As for the admission index, I normalize the GPA by cohort and major
so that its unit is the number of standard deviations from the mean in one's major
and cohort. I use these two sets of variables together to measure the general and
specific academic human capital accumulated by graduation. In Chapter 1, I find
that normalized GPAs positively and significantly predict the long-run production
of patents for the engineering and science students from the 1980-2005 cohorts.
Thus, I consider my measures to be a reasonable proxy for the potential produc-
tivity in the engineering and science sectors. However, they do not necessarily
provide a comprehensive picture of all the skills that determine future career suc-
cess in finance. For instance, soft skills such as networking and communication
abilities are likely to matter for salaries but have no direct measures. To under-
stand sorting, however, it is still important to know the return to academic skills
in finance.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 reports the mean characteristics for the 2006-2010 cohorts by their
initial career choices. Among all graduates who received a bachelor's degree from
MIT between 2006 and 2010, around 44% were female and the average age at grad-
12Both are available for around 95% of the sample. The admission index does not apply to
transfer students.
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uation was 22.56. The vast majority of students, around 86% of the sample, chose
an engineering or science major, whereas around 9.4% majored in economics or
management. Nearly 70% of the students received financial aid in their senior year
and around 34% received more than $20,000 that year. Approximately 37% of the
students were Caucasian Americans, 28% were Asian Americans, 27% were other
minorities, including Hispanic, African, and Native American, and 9% were inter-
national students. Nearly 33% of the graduates between 2006 and 2010 went to a
high school in the northeast region and nearly 12% went to a high school outside
the United States.
The term "N/A" indicates that initial placement data are missing for students
who did not respond to the GSS or did not answer the relevant questions. Those
students, overall, had a similar demographic composition as the rest except they
were less likely to be female. They also had lower than average admission index
scores and GPAs. Among the students with valid placement records, around 44.4%
were going to graduate school immediately after graduating from MIT.13 Condi-
tional on not entering graduate school, 16.4% of the graduates were going to work
for a financial firm, 33% were starting in the technology and industrial sector, and
9.5% were going to consulting firms. Although the number of graduates going
into the "Other" sector is larger than any of the aforementioned three sectors, it
is because this sector includes a wide range of post-graduate plans, from working
for firms that do not belong to the previous three sectors to taking non-working
positions such as a traveling fellowship.
Financiers are less likely to be female and more likely to be Asian American.
Since the overwhelming majority of graduates from MIT are engineering and sci-
13In 2010, almost 90% of those going to graduate school in 2010 were entering a master's or PhD
program in science and engineering. Data on the type of graduate program are not available for
earlier cohorts.
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ence majors, it is not surprising that over 60% of financiers come from engineering
and science majors. Financiers also have the highest average base salary among
graduates entering the labor market. The average base salaries in the consulting
and technology and industrial sectors are similar, both around 14% lower than in
finance. This is likely to underestimate the earnings gap between finance and other
sectors since finance also has tremendous potential for bonus earnings and future
wage growth (Oyer, 2008), which is unobserved here. Compared to their working
peers, financiers also, on average, have higher signing bonuses, including add-on
benefits such as reimbursements for relocation costs. Signing bonuses, however,
are a one-time transfer, so I do not include them as part of annual income.
Ranked by the average normalized admission index score, the order of sec-
tors is finance, graduate school, consulting, technology and industrial, and other.
The average normalized admission index scores of the first two sectors are posi-
tive, meaning that students going into those sectors are likely to have admission
index scores above the mean of their cohorts. However, the ranking is different if I
use normalized GPAs. Students going to graduate school have, on average, much
higher GPAs than the rest. The average normalized GPA of financiers is still posi-
tive, but it is also lower than the average in consulting. Figure 2.1 presents a graph-
ical illustration of these relations by separately plotting the distributions of admis-
sion index scores and GPAs in different sectors for the economics and management
majors and the engineering and science majors. The contrast between GPAs and
admission index scores is particularly sharp among the engineering and science
majors. For economics and management majors, the distributions of admission
index scores and GPAs are similar across different sectors.
Figure 2.2 shows the clear impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the initial
placements of the MIT bachelor's graduates. According to the plot on the left,
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the proportion of graduates entering finance took a large dip in 2009 and did not
recover in 2010, similar to the two-year stock market return." The plot on the
right shows that other sectors, including consulting, as well as technology and
industrial experience similar trends as finance, whereas the pattern of graduate
school enrollment is the opposite. Figure 2.3 plots the distributions before and
after the financial crisis of admission indices, GPAs, and real annual salaries for
financiers from different fields of study. The average admission index score, GPA,
and real salary are all higher in the post-crisis cohorts.
2.4 Financiers' Raw Academic Talent and Skill Devel-
opment at MIT
This section shows how financiers differ from others in their raw academic
talent and skills developed at MIT. Raw talent is measured before students enter
MIT. Meanwhile, students develop more specialized skills at MIT based on their
chosen career paths.15 Thus, I compare raw talent and skill development in differ-
ent equations.
2.4.1 Selection into Finance Based on Raw Talent
I run the following logit regressions at the individual level:
Pr(Sectori = 1) = G (3X3i + 6TIf + 6 (E')j + ei), (2.1)
14The two-year stock return is calculated as the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
market return during an individual's sophomore and junior years.
151 assume that individuals' career interests do not affect their academic performance in high
school since college admission is the main incentive for performing well.
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where i denotes the graduate; k denotes the field; j denotes the cohort; X, the raw
academic talent, is measured by the normalized admission index score; 1I is the set
of demographics; and D' are cohort dummies.
Equation (2.1) compares how individuals who end up in different career paths
differ in these observed characteristics, including raw academic talent, which are
mostly determined upon entrance to MIT.16 Table 2.2 reports the estimated marginal
effects. Without controlling for demographics or cohort dummies, a one standard
deviation increase in the admission index score is associated with a 1.9% increase
in the likelihood of becoming a financier. However, the effect disappears once
controls are included. On the other hand, the relation between the admission
index score and the tendency to go to graduate school is robust to the inclusion
of controls. Conditional on observed demographics, a student whose admission
index score is one standard deviation higher has a 7.6% higher likelihood of en-
tering graduate school, a 0.9% lower likelihood of going into consulting, and a
2.5% lower likelihood of working for a technology or industrial firm. All of these
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. These results sug-
gest that graduate school is the most attractive destination for students with high
raw academic talent, but finance is also a strong contender. Consistent with the
summary statistics, female students are significantly less likely to work in finance,
consulting, or technology and industrial sectors and significantly more likely to go
to graduate school. Compared to the Caucasian American students, Asian Ameri-
cans are significantly more likely to work in finance. Receiving financial aid does
not correlate with the tendency to go into finance.
16Although I observe only the amount of financial aid received in students' senior year, con-
versations with Student Financial Services indicate that it is a good proxy of student aid received
throughout college.
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2.4.2 Skill Development at MIT
To receive a bachelor's degree from MIT, a student must satisfy the require-
ments for the core curriculum (the General Institute Requirements) as well as for
the departmental program(s) of his or her choice.17 The core curriculum requires
students to take courses in a wide range of subjects, from science to humanities.
In the first and second years, students usually take general courses in the core cur-
riculum and introductory courses in the majors of their choice. By the end of the
second year, all students are required to declare at least one major. They then focus
on field-specific courses in their junior and senior years.
Being an economics or management major is not a prerequisite to getting a
job in finance. As seen in Table 2.1, over half of the financiers are engineering and
science majors. However, it is reasonable to think that students may allocate their
time differently based on their career interests and the costs of developing differ-
ent skills. For instance, someone set on entering a top doctoral program may work
hard to achieve the best grades, whereas students interested in finance may spend
more time attending networking events, developing soft skills such as communi-
cations, or even practicing trading stocks and derivatives. To see the differences in
students' skill development, I run the following regressions:
Skilli = cDec + BXi + 6I; + O(Ej)j + c, (2.2)
where Dsec is a set of dummies indicating student i's initial sector and X, II, and
EJ are the same as in Equation (2.1).
Equation (2.2) is a descriptive regression showing how students with differ-
ent career interests differ in their skill development at MIT. However, it should
17See the 2011-2012 MIT Course Catalog for more information.
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not be interpreted as causal, since students' skill development could also influ-
ence their career interests. Table 2.3 reports the results for two measures of skill:
whether one majors in engineering or science and a normalized GPA. Compared
to financiers, students who end up going to graduate school are significantly more
likely to major in engineering and science at MIT. Among engineering and science
majors, those going to graduate school also have significantly higher GPAs than
financiers and the average difference is over half a standard deviation, even af-
ter controlling for raw academic talent and other observables. This is consistent
with Figure 2.1, which shows that between financiers and those entering graduate
school, the difference in average normalized GPAs is substantially larger than the
difference in raw academic talent.
For economics and management majors, those going to graduate school have
similar GPAs as those entering finance. Students entering other sectors are also
more likely to major in engineering and science, but their GPAs are generally not
significantly different from those of financiers. The normalized admission index
positively and significantly predicts the likelihood of majoring in engineering and
science. As expected, it is also positively and significantly associated with nor-
malized GPA, although the relation is not one to one. A one standard deviation
increase in the admission index score is associated with a 0.3 standard deviation
increase in the cumulative GPA at MIT. Since the admission index score can be
thought of as a measure of the potential for developing academic skills in the Roy
model, the empirical results or talent would develop different skills, depending on
their career interests.
In Chapter 1, I show that engineering and science majors have significantly
higher patent production in the long term than their MIT classmates. Furthermore,
normalized GPAs also positively and significantly predict patent production. Since
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engineering and science majors with high GPAs are likely to enter graduate school,
part of these relations could be driven by the causal impact of a science and engi-
neering graduate program on patent productivity. Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to assume that such talents and skills are also highly valued in the engineering
and science sectors. Thus, the results here suggest positive sorting into graduate
programs in science and engineering.
However, it is still unclear whether there is positive sorting in finance. Both
possibilities could be consistent with the finding that financiers do not necessarily
have the best academic potential. On one hand, it could be that the financial sec-
tor does not value GPAs as much as graduate schools do. In that case, it would
make sense for potential financiers to develop other skills-such as networking
and communications-during college, which are valued at a relative premium in
finance. In other words, the skills valued in finance are sufficiently different from
those valued in science and engineering sectors, so there is positive sorting in both
sectors. On the other hand, it is possible that finance also highly values engineering
and science skills, but those with high academic skills have a particular inclination
to stay in engineering and science. In that case, there would be negative sorting
into finance. Stem (2004), for instance, shows that scientists are willing to take a
pay cut for the freedom to pursue their own research agenda and publish in re-
search journals. There is also anecdotal evidence from MIT where top students
in mathematics, physics, electrical engineering, and computer science turn down
highly lucrative job offers from financial firms to pursue doctoral degrees in their
fields.
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2.5 The Financial Crisis as a Natural Experiment
This section uses the recent financial crisis to study the return to academic
skills in finance as well as the nature of sorting.
2.5.1 Impact on Entry into Finance
To see how the financial crisis affects the probability of going into finance, I
run the following logistic regression:
Pr(Sectori = Fin) = G ( 1Rj + -yii + e ci), (2.3)
where Pr(Sectori = Fin) is one if graduate i from cohort j works in finance after
graduation, Rj is the two-year stock return from December of year j - 3 to De-
cember of year j - 1 (i.e., the return during the student's sophomore and junior
years),18 and 17 is the set of controls, including demographics and a linear cohort
trend. Since Rj varies by cohort, I can no longer control for cohort dummies. Con-
trolling for a linear cohort trend is likely to underestimate the effect on entry into
finance since identification comes mainly from the market crash in 2008. Thus, I
view those estimates as conservative.
Table 2.4 presents the coefficient estimates separately for all students, eco-
nomics and management students, and engineering and science students. Since
the crisis could also affect the choice of major, I report the results with and without
dummies for fields of study. For all students, a one standard deviation decrease in
the stock return, which is around 24 percentage points,19 decreases the probability
18Since the recruiting season usually starts in the fall of the senior year, I use the stock market
return during the two previous years so that it is fully determined by then. The results change little
if I use the return between Septembe rj-3 and September j-1.
19Between 2008 and 2009, the difference in the two-year stock returns is around 60 percentage
points, or around 2.5 standard deviations.
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of entering finance by around 2.5 percentage points, without controlling for a lin-
ear cohort trend or fields of study. Controlling only for a linear cohort trend, the
same change in the stock return decreases the probability of entering finance by
around 2 percentage points, which is a 21.5% drop relative to the base probability
of 9.13%. Since the financial crisis is a particularly strong shock to the industry,
it is reasonable that the magnitudes of my findings are higher than what Oyer
(2008) finds, namely, that a one standard deviation increase in the stock return in-
creases the likelihood of entering investment banking by around 14% for Stanford
MBA graduates. Controlling for fields of study decreases the estimated impact of
the stock return, suggesting that the crisis is likely to have a small but noticeable
impact on the choices of majors. For economics and management majors, a one
standard deviation drop in the stock return increases the likelihood of going into
finance by 5.3 percentage points, or around 14% of their base probability. In con-
trast, for engineering and science majors, the same shock decreases the likelihood
of financial employment by roughly 20%.
The following multinomial logit model estimates how the stock market return
affects relative selection into finance as opposed to other sectors:
(Pr( Sectors = 1) _Log =rSctr = 1) Rj + Ti'i + eij, (2.4)
L Pr(Sectori = Fin)
where 1 denotes the non-financial sector, j is the cohort, Rj is the two-year stock
return, and Pi is the set of controls, as in Equation (2.3). Thus, #l captures how the
relative sizes of the sectors change with job market conditions.
Table 2.5 presents the coefficient estimates. Overall, a one standard deviation
increase in the stock market return around the mean increases the likelihood of
going into finance by around 2.1% and decreases the likelihood of going to gradu-
ate school by 3.4%. Both the consulting and technology and industrial sectors also
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boom when the stock return is high, although to a much less degree than finance.
These results are driven mainly by the engineering and science majors. For eco-
nomics and management majors, the two-year stock return does not significantly
affect the relative margin of going to graduate school. Overall, I find that a fi-
nancier's alternative sector is likely to be graduate school for an engineering and
science major and other non-consulting firms for an economics and management
major.
2.5.2 Base Salary in Finance
To show the value of academic talent and skills in finance, I estimate the fol-
lowing wage equation:
G(Salary ) = aXi + /Wi + 6112 + 6(ZE)j + e, (2.5)
where the dependent variable is the real annual base salary in finance, or its log-
arithm; X is raw academic talent, measured by the normalized admission index;
W is field-specific skill, measured by field of study and GPA; H is the set of de-
mographic variables; and EJ are the cohort dummies. Although employers do
not directly observe the admission index score, they may indirectly observe raw
academic talent through interviews. The coefficients of X and W also capture the
return to other unobserved characteristics that are correlated with observed skills
and talent and valued in finance (e.g., diligence).
Since selection into finance is non-random, ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mates of Equation (2.5) may be biased, depending on the nature of sorting (Heck-
man, 1979). To correct for any selection bias, I rely on the assumption that entry-
level base salaries and the nature of sorting in finance are not affected by short-term
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fluctuations in the stock market. Although the crisis may affect financiers' year-
end bonuses, the base salaries of entry-level positions are likely to be sticky. For
instance, the median annual initial base salary in nominal terms among MIT grad-
uates working for JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley was $60,000
U.S. dollars before the crisis (2006-2008) and $70,000 after. However, since the
growth in nominal wages in finance may not exactly follow the Consumer Price
Index, I need to include cohort dummies to control for measurement errors in real
salaries. Thus, the stock market return by itself can no longer be an instrument
since it is fully absorbed by the cohort dummies. Instead, I use the stock return in-
teracted with the field of study and exploit the differential effects of stock market
returns across different fields of study, as in Section 2.5.1.
Table 2.6 reports the estimates using both OLS and full information maximal
likelihood (FIML) with Heckman correction. Using the linear salary and log salary
gives qualitatively similar results with different statistical significance. A Wald
test does not reject the null hypothesis that there is no bias from selection at the
10% level in the linear specification, but it rejects it in the log specification. There
is supporting evidence that students with higher admission index scores end up
with higher salaries in finance. A one standard deviation increase in the admis-
sion index score is associated with around $5700 more, or a 4.6% increase, in the
annual base salary. The effect is significant across all specifications except the FIML
specification with log salaries. The coefficient estimates for being an engineering
and science major and having a higher GPA in engineering and science are both
positive, but the standard errors are also large. These results suggest that, condi-
tional on raw academic talent, the marginal return as a financier to having extra
engineering and science skills may not be high for MIT graduates. Since the core
curriculum requires all MIT graduates to accumulate at least some skills in engi-
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neering and science, this does not mean that finance does not value engineering
and science skills at all. The marginal return may be very high for having some
minimum of training in engineering and science, but such variations may not exist
within the MIT population.
2.5.3 Comparing Marginal and Average Financiers
Since I do not observe all the skills valued in finance, it is difficult to study
the nature of sorting into finance based on the wage equation above. Instead, I
use the financial crisis to identify sorting. The significant impact of the financial
crisis on entry into finance implies that some students did not become financiers
because of the shock. I call those individuals whose career choices are sensitive
to this shock "marginal financiers." In contrast, "infra-marginal financiers" work
in finance, regardless of graduating economic conditions. Following Gruber et al.
(1999) and Chandra and Staiger (2007), I develop an empirical test to determine
how marginal financiers differ from average financiers:
Yj = a + 61n (Sj )+ E, (2.6)
where Y is an outcome variable of interest (e.g., admission index score), Sj is the
share of financiers in cohort j, and the regression is run on the sample offinanciers
only.
Intuitively, 6 measures how much the average characteristic changes when
there are more financiers. As the proportion of financiers increases, their average
outcome changes based on how each additional financier differs from the average.
A negative 6 implies that each additional financier decreases the mean outcome of
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the entire group of financiers. Mathematically, the relation is
6 _ YS_ ±+ s__ y_~
Oln(S) S -Oln() OS S
This shows that 6 measures the difference between a marginal financier's out-
come (L) and the average outcome (J). To isolate the effect of the financial crisis,
I instrument in (Sj) with the two-year stock market return.
Given a measure of the "fit for finance," the difference between marginal and
average financiers reveals the nature of sorting into finance. The assumption is
that the nature of sorting does not change within the sample period. For instance,
it cannot be the case that finance becomes disproportionally less attractive to in-
dividuals with higher skills. If there is positive selection into finance, marginal fi-
nanciers should be less qualified to enter finance than the average financiers, while
negative sorting into finance would imply the opposite.
Table 2.7 reports the results for two measures of fit: the observed log real
salary and the predicted log salary. The predicted log salary is derived from the
FIML estimates of Equation (2.5), calculated using only individual characteristics
and excluding cohort effects. In addition, I compare the observed academic talents
and skills of marginal and average financiers. The results suggest that marginal
financiers earn almost 16% less, according to their observed base salary, than aver-
age financiers. Although their predicted log salary, normalized admission index,
and GPA are also lower, the differences are not statistically significant. Since the
predicted salary does not account for unobserved skills valued in finance, which
financiers are likely to have developed in college, it is likely to underestimate the
degree of positive sorting. At the same time, the observed log real salary may
have measurement errors that are correlated with entry into finance, for instance,
if nominal growth in financial salary is higher than for the Consumer Price Index.
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However, controlling for a linear trend in the observed salary almost doubles the
estimated effect. Conditional on a linear cohort trend, marginal financiers earn
almost 30% less than average financiers.
It is also possible that the crisis changed the nature of sorting into finance. In
particular, one may suspect that the sector has become less attractive if society per-
ceives a career in finance to be riskier or more rent seeking. Thus, it is possible that
the return to skill inclusive of taste has decreased, resulting in a decrease in the
degree of positive sorting into finance. In this case, my finding is a lower bound of
the positive sorting into finance. Overall, this section provides two findings that
are consistent with each other and with the predictions in the conceptual frame-
work. First, finance does not value extra science and engineering skills as much as
science and engineering graduate programs. Second, positive sorting into finance
likely exists.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper presents three key results on the self-selection of MIT bachelor's
graduates in their initial career choices. First, finance is competing against science
and engineering graduate programs for the very best talent from MIT. Second,
there is positive sorting into graduate school, in that students pursuing a graduate
degree are better in their observed academic talents and skills, which are highly
valued in the academic sector. Third, there is also positive sorting into finance.
Finance does not value academic skills as much as graduate school and, as a re-
sult, students interested in finance are likely to develop a different set of skills that
are unobserved here. Although the recent financial crisis, as an exogenous shock,
has pushed some engineering and science majors out of finance and into graduate
school, financiers and students entering graduate school are not substitutable in
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their skills, since they followed different paths of skill development at MIT. There-
fore, in the case when it is socially optimal to encourage or discourage entry into
finance, policies that affect the relative payoffs of different career paths at the time
of graduation may be too late, since students have already specialized in their skill
development.
By providing evidence of self-selection, this paper builds toward an under-
standing of the welfare implications of the growing financial sector in the United
States. However, it is important to note the differences between MIT bachelor's
graduates and the national science and engineering population. As the top-ranked
engineering school ranked by the U.S. News, MIT is likely to attract students who
are best suited for engineering and science in terms of both their talents and tastes.
Thus, even though a marginal financier from MIT may not have been the most
productive engineer or scientist from MIT, he or she may still have above-average
talent compared to the broader population. Furthermore, most MIT graduates
have at least some skills in engineering and science. While the marginal return to
engineering and science skills for someone with no such skills may be high, there
are no variations in my sample to identify the effect. An important direction for
future research would be to generalize the methodology developed in this paper
to study a more representative sample of engineering and science students.
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Table 2.1: By Initial Career: Mean Characteristics (2006-2010)
All Finance Grad. Sch. Consult. Tech. Other N/A
N
Initial Annual Salary
Signing bonus
Measures of Skills
Norm. Adm. Index
Normalized GPA
Engr. & Science
Econ & Management
Other Majors
Demographics
Proportion Female
Age at Graduation
Financial Aid > 0
Fin. Aid > 20,000/yr
Ethnicity/Citizenship
Caucasian American
Asian American
International
Other Minorities
High School Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
International
4,936 286
- 72,967
- 12,315
-0.005
-0.007
0.859
0.094
0.047
0.442
22.56
0.698
0.357
0.369
0.278
0.086
0.267
0.327
0.126
0.245
0.187
0.116
0.190
0.061
0.619
0.371
0.010
0.367
22.34
0.703
0.350
0.339
0.402
0.080
0.178
0.353
0.136
0.231
0.171
0.080
1,391
0.153
0.442
0.946
0.027
0.027
0.498
22.25
0.733
0.341
0.386
0.298
0.091
0.225
0.334
0.142
0.222
0.180
0.122
166
64,083
7,942
-0.028
0.116
0.735
0.247
0.018
0.440
22.28
0.663
0.319
0.355
0.361
0.072
0.211
0.307
0.108
0.283
0.199
0.102
576
63,770
4,716
-0.129
-0.217
0.938
0.038
0.024
0.462
22.47
0.733
0.385
0.418
0.255
0.059
0.267
0.335
0.127
0.260
0.184
0.094
712
51,536
263.9
-0.236
-0.247
0.810
0.100
0.090
0.525
22.43
0.770
0.406
0.389
0.236
0.056
0.319
0.332
0.131
0.256
0.204
0.079
1,805
-0.027
-0.213
0.835
0.103
0.062
0.371
22.93
0.634
0.303
0.338
0.259
0.104
0.299
0.316
0.110
0.252
0.187
0.104
Notes: This table reports the means of individual characteristics by initial sector,
including individuals with missing information (under the N/A column). Initial
Annual Salary, Signing Bonus, and Financial Aid are in 2010 dollars. Normalized
Admission Index and SAT scores are missing for around 5% of the sample.
121
Table 2.2: Cross-Sectional Estimates of Selection into Initial Sectors
Dep. Var. Finance Graduate School Consulting Tech.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Norm. Adm. Index 0.019** 0.007 0.072*** 0.076*** -0.009*** -0.024***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008)
Female -0.047*** 0.043*** -0.017** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Age at Graduation -0.001 -0.046*** -0.002 0.020**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Asian American 0.053*** -0.031 0.023 -0.023**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011)
International 0.013 0.044 0.009 -0.071**
(0.026) (0.049) (0.029) (0.029)
Other Minorities -0.014 0.006 -0.010 -0.025**
(0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
AidE(0, 20000/year] -0.019 0.034* -0.015* -0.014
(0.013) (0.020) (0.009) (0.024)
Aid > 20,000/year -0.004 0.008 -0.023** -0.003
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.014)
HS Region Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
N 3,013 3,013 3,013 3,013 3,013 3,013
Notes: Person-level observations. The coefficients reported are marginal effects
from logistic models. The dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator variable for
(Columns (1) and (2)) working for a financial firm after graduation, (Columns (3)
and (4)) entering a graduate program, (Column (5)) going into consulting, or (Col-
umn (6)) going into technology and industrial. Robust standard errors clustered at
the cohort level are shown in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate
p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The sample includes the 2006-2010
cohorts with valid responses on the GSSs (64% of the total sample). Normalized Ad-
mission Index: see text for the definition. Caucasian American is the omitted group
for race. AidE(0, 20000/yearl and Aid > 20,000/year: indicator variables for whether
the amount of support received in the senior year in 2010 dollars is positive and be-
low 20,000 or above 20,000, respectively. HS Region Dummies and Cohort Dummies:
indicator variables for high school regions and cohorts, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Skill Development and Career Choices
Dep. Var. Engr. & Science Normalized GPA
Sample All All Engr. & Scien. Econ. & Mgmt.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Graduate School 0.212*** 0.388*** 0.559*** 0.051
(0.010) (0.075) (0.088) (0.090)
Consulting 0.046*** 0.121 0.213 0.149
(0.013) (0.084) (0.105) (0.081)
Tech. & Industrial 0.124*** -0.134 0.020 -0.105
(0.001) (0.064) (0.078) (0.144)
Other 0.080*** -0.132 -0.013 -0.204***
(0.009) (0.096) (0.117) (0.040)
Normalized Adm. Index 0.030*** 0.284*** 0.297*** 0.330***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.052)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,013 3,013 2,627 271
Notes: Person-level observations. The coefficients reported are the marginal ef-
fects from the logistic models for Column (1) and for OLS for Columns (2)-(4).
The dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator variable for (Column (1)) majoring in
engineering and science or (Columns (2)-(4)) the normalized grade point average.
Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown in parentheses. The
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The
sample includes the 2006-2010 cohorts with valid responses on the GSSs (64% of
the total sample). Normalized Admission Index: see text for the definition. All the
regressions control indicator variables for demographics and indicator variables
for cohorts.
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Table 2.4: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Entry into Finance
Sample All Engr. & Scien. Econ. & Mgmt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stock Return 0.105*** 0.084*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.225***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.014) (0.044)
Field-Specific Skills No No Yes No No
Linear Cohort No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,013 3,013 3,013 271 2,627
Notes: Person-level observations. The coefficients reported are marginal effects
from logistic models. The dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator variable for go-
ing to work for a financial firm after graduation. Robust standard errors corrected
and clustered at the cohort level are shown in parentheses. The superscripts *, **,
and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The samples include
(Columns (1)-(3)) all majors in the 2006-2010 cohorts, (Column (4)) engineering
and science majors, and (Column (5)) economics and management majors. Indi-
viduals with missing initial sector data are excluded (36% of the population). Stock
Return: the CRSP market return during the sophomore and junior years. Field-
Specific Skills: includes indicator variables for the field of study, the normalized
GPA interacted with each indicator for fields. All the regressions include the fol-
lowing controls: age at graduation; indicator variables for gender, race, and high
school region; indicator variables for whether the amount of support received in
the senior year in 2010 dollars is positive and below 20,000 or above 20,000; and
the normalized admission index.
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Table 2.5: Relative Selection into Sectors
Finance Grad. School Consulting Tech. & Industrial Other
Panel A: All Students (N = 3,013)
Stock Return - -1.353*** -0.389*** -0.850*** -1.116***
- (0.088) (0.150) (0.238) (0.105)
APr 0.021 -0.034 0.008 0.009 -0.004
Panel B: Engr. & Science (N = 2,627)
Stock Return - -1.483*** -0.756** -0.891** -1.337***
- (0.204) (0.374) (0.371) (0.255)
APr 0.016 -0.031 0.005 0.016 -0.006
Panel C: Econ. & Mgmt. (N = 271)
Stock Return - 0.148 0.075 -3.359*** -1.509**
- (0.396) (0.428) (1.017) (0.678)
APr 0.053 0.022 0.022 -0.042 -0.055
Notes: Person-level observations. All estimates are from multinomial logistic mod-
els. The dependent variable is the initial sector, with five categories listed in the
column names. Finance is the base category. Robust standard errors clustered at
the cohort level are shown in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate
p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The samples include all majors in
the 2006-2010 cohorts (Panel A), the engineering and science majors (Panel B), and
the economics and management majors (Panel C). Individuals with missing initial
sector are excluded (36% of the population). Stock Return: the CRSP market return
during the sophomore and junior years. APr: the change in the probability of go-
ing into a sector calculated from a one standard deviation increase in Stock Return
around the mean, that is, from 0.5 standard deviation below the mean to 0.5 stan-
dard deviation above. All the regressions include the following controls: age at
graduation; indicator variables for gender, race, and high school region; indicator
variables for whether the amount of support received in the senior year in 2010
dollars is positive and below 20,000 or above 20,000; the normalized admission
index, and linear cohort.
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Table 2.6: Return to Skills in Finance
Dep. Var. Salary Log(Salary)
(1) OLS (2) FIML (3) OLS (4) FIML
Norm. Adm. Index 5760.234* 5640.419** 0.069** 0.046
(2305.842) (2361.202) (0.023) (0.033)
Engr. & Science 1468.525 2493.624 0.033 0.239
(3938.788) (5628.569) (0.051) (0.164)
Other Majors 1574.949 2713.810 0.055 0.282
(4878.151) (6569.189) (0.065) (0.206)
GPA * Econ. & Mgmt. -3703.925 -3683.553* -0.021 -0.020
(2035.316) (1963.239) (0.028) (0.026)
GPA * Engr. & Science 609.163 759.917 0.013 0.043
(2841.072) (2723.436) (0.033) (0.036)
GPA * Other Majors 37855.613 37980.951** 0.401 0.451**
(17763.712) (16903.153) (0.202) (0.190)
N 261 3,002 261 3,002
Notes: Person-level observations. The coefficients reported are from the OLS for
Columns (1) and (3) and from the FIML for Columns (2) and (4). The dependent
variable is the real annual base salary in 2010 dollars or its logarithm. Robust
standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown in parentheses. The super-
scripts *, **, and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The sam-
ples include (Columns (1) and (3)) the 2006-2010 cohorts who are going to work
for a financial firm and (Columns (2) and (4)) the 2006-2010 cohorts with valid re-
sponses on the GSSs. The instruments in Columns (2) and (4) include Stock Return
interacted with being an engineering & science major or another major. Normal-
ized Admission Index: see text for definition. Economics and management majors
are the omitted group. Controls include age at graduation; indicator variables for
gender, race, and high school region; indicator variables for whether the amount
of support received in the senior year in 2010 dollars is positive and below 20,000
or above 20,000, and cohort dummies.
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Table 2.7: Differences between Marginal and Average Financiers
Dep. Var. Log(Sal) Log(Sal) Adm. Ind. GPA Log(Sal)
Panel A: OLS
(Al) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Log(Financiers Share) -0.130* -0.041 -0.403 -0.203 -0.260**
(0.059) (0.022) (0.353) (0.234) (0.076)
Linear Cohort No No No No Yes
Panel B: IV
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
Log (Financiers Share) -0.157** -0.045 -0.423 -0.308 -0.292**
(0.055) (0.026) (0.357) (0.218) (0.078)
Linear Cohort No No No No Yes
N 275 272 272 286 275
Notes: Person-level observations. All estimates are from OLS in Panel A or in-
strumental variables (IV) models in Panel B. Robust standard errors corrected and
clustered at the cohort level are shown in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and
*** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The samples include all fi-
nanciers from the 2006-2010 cohorts. The dependent variables are explained in the
text. Log (Financiers Share): the logarithm of the proportion of financiers in the co-
hort. The instrumental variable in the IV specifications is the CRSP market return
during the sophomore and junior years.
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Figure 2.1: Mean and 95% Confidence Intervals of Skills by Field and Initial Career:
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Notes: Person-level observations. This figure plots, by major, the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the normalized
admission index and GPA for economics and management majors (on the left) and engineering and science majors (on
the right). The sample includes the individuals in the 2006-2010 cohorts who are going to either the technology and
industrial, finance, or consulting sectors or to graduate school.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Sectors by Cohort
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Notes: Person-level observations. This figure plots, by cohort, the proportion of students going into finance against the
two-year stock return (on the left) and the proportions of students going to graduate school, consulting, or the technology
and industrial sector (on the right). The sample includes the 2006-2010 cohorts with valid responses on the GSSs, around
64% of the total sample. Stock Return: the CRSP market return during the sophomore and junior years.
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Figure 2.3: Pre- and Post-Crisis Financiers: Mean and 95% Confidence Intervals of Skills and Salaries
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Notes: Personal-level observations. This figure plots the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the normalized admission
index and GPA of students who entered finance before and after the 2008 financial crisis (on the left) and their initial
annual salaries in 2010 dollars (on the right).
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Assigning Field
Based the 2011-2012 MIT Course Catalog, I denote majors under the School
of Engineering as "engineering" majors and majors under the School of Science as
"science" majors. More specifically, the engineering majors include Aeronautics
and Astronautics (Course 16), Biological Engineering (Course 20), Chemical Engi-
neering (Course 10), Civil and Environmental Engineering (Course 1), Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science (Course 6), Materials Science and Engineering
(Course 3), Mechanical Engineering (Course 2), Nuclear Science and Engineering
(Course 22), and Ocean Engineering (Course 13). The science majors include
include Biology (Course 7), Brain and Cognitive Sciences (Course 9), Chemistry
(Course 5), Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sciences (Course 12), Mathemat-
ics (Course 18), and Physics (Course 8). Economics and management majors are
from Courses 14 and 15, respectively. The rest of the majors include all unassigned
majors, such as architecture, political science, and literature.
2.8.2 Assigning Sector
I assign the initial sectors using the GSSs. There are five sectors: 1) finance, 2)
consulting, 3) technology and industrial, 4) graduate school, and 5) others. First,
students self-report whether they are going to work or to graduate school. Then,
based on their employers, I determine the working graduates in the first three
sectors. The last sector includes students who are neither working nor going to
graduate school (e.g., taking a traveling fellowship) as well as those working in
other sectors, such as law and real estate.
20 Course 13 has been merged into Course 2.
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Similar to Chapter 1, I first rely on common knowledge about the firms to as-
sign employers to finance, consulting, and technology and industrial. For instance,
financial firms include investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan,
as well as hedge funds, such as D. E. Shaw and Renaissance Technologies. Con-
sulting firms include Boston Consulting Group, McKinsey, and so forth. Google,
Facebook, Raytheon, IBM, and Intel are some examples of firms in the technol-
ogy and industrial sector. I also use keyword matching, where firms with certain
keywords are assigned to a certain sector. Firms that are unassigned after these
two steps are looked up on the Internet and assigned a sector based on their core
business.
Samples of keywords used to identify each sector are as follows.
" Technology and industrial: tech machine syst dynamics scien research com-
munication devic wire manufact telecom syst soft defense instrument engi-
neer space material equipment aircraft energ motor electr industri robot net-
work chemical comput auto mobile.
" Finance: fund capital trading asset securities venture wealth holding bank
invest.
" Consulting: consult.
2.8.3 Decomposing the Trend in Majoring in Economics and Man-
agement
As Figure A2.2 shows, the proportion of students majoring in economics and
management has increased over the last three decades. Part of this increase may be
due to the growing diversity among the undergraduate population at MIT. Com-
pared to the summary statistics in Chapter 1, which studies earlier cohorts of MIT
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bachelor's graduates, the sample in this chapter has more female and non-white
students. I perform a Oaxaca-style decomposition to determine the relative contri-
butions of compositional changes in student demographics versus the increasing
tendency to major in economics and management, conditional on demographics:
APr(Field = EM) = pr, * AH + A * Hpre + A6 * All, (2.7)
where, conditional on a cutoff cohort J, APr(Field = EM) is the change in the
proportion of economics and management majors before and after J, 6pre are the
regression coefficients for demographics before and including J, and fPre is the
set of average demographic compositions before and including year J. The re-
gressions are estimated using a logit model. Thus, the change in the proportion
of economics and management majors can be broken down into three parts: the
"endowment effect", due to changes in student demographics; the "coefficient ef-
fect", due to changes in the tendency to major in economics and management,
conditional on demographics; and the interaction of the two.
Table A2.2 reports the results for using different years as the cutoff. For ex-
ample, the first column shows that 8.7% of the graduates in the 1991-2010 cohorts
major in economics and management, which is 3.8% more than the graduates in
the 1980-1990 cohorts. Out of the 3.8% difference, 2.6% is due to the coefficient
effect, whereas only 0.5% is due to the endowment effect. The results are similar
using 1995, 2000, and 2005 as the cutoff years. Depending on the cutoff, changes in
the tendency to major in economics and management conditional on demograph-
ics could explain between 58% and 75% of the overall increase in the proportion
of economics and management majors. Changes in demographic composition, in
contrast, could only account for between 13% and 33%. Thus, there has been a
clear increase in the tendency to major in economics and management at MIT over
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the past three decades, controlling for student demographics. This is consistent
with the observation of Philippon and Reshef (2009) that the relative wage gap of
an average financier over an average engineer has grown from less than 10% in the
early 1980s to over 30% in the early 2000s.
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2.8.4 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A2.1: Data Overview: Variables and Sources
Variables Cohorts Source
Demographics and Academic Records 1980-2010 MIT Registrar's Office
Admission Index and SAT Scores 2004-2010 MIT Admissions Office
Amount of Support from MIT 1994-2010 MIT Student Financial Services
Initial Placement and Salary 2006-2010 MIT Career Services
Notes: This provides an overview of the data. Demographics and academic
records are available for everyone who received Admission index and SAT scores
are available for around 95% of the sample between 2004 and 2010. The amount
of support from MIT is calculated during the senior year and is available for the
1994-2010 cohorts. Initial placement and salary are self-reported on the GSSs,
where the information is missing for 36% of the sample.
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Table A2.2: Decomposition of Trends in Majoring in Economics and Management
(1980-2010)
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005
Means
Before 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.070***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
After 0.087*** 0.094*** 0.100*** 0.094***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Difference 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Decomposition
AEndowments 0.005** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ACoefficients 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Interaction 0.007*** 0.004* 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Notes: Person-level observations. Here N=32,059. This table reports the Oaxaca
decomposition results from logistic models using different years as the cutoff. The
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. See
the text for details.
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Figure A2.1: Proportion of Financiers by Cohort (1980-2005)
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Notes: Person-level observations.This figure plots, by cohort, the proportion of
graduates working in finance in June 2011, based on self-reported employment
information from Infinite Connection. The sample includes the 1980-2005 cohorts.
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Figure A2.2: Proportions of Bachelor's Graduates by Field and by Cohort (1980-
2010)
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Notes: Person-level observations. This figure plots, by cohort, the proportions of
students majoring in economics and management (left scale), engineering (right
scale), and science (right scale). The sample includes the 1980-2010 cohorts.
138
Chapter 3
Asset Accumulation and Labor Force
Participation of Disability Insurance
Applicantsi
3.1 Introduction
Designed to protect the working population from the risk of total disability,
the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is one of the largest income transfer
programs in the United States. In December 2010, the program paid 9.6 billion
U.S. dollars in benefits to over 9.4 million people, including 8.2 million disabled
workers (Social Security Social Security Administration, 2010). To qualify for SSDI,
a worker must be younger than the full retirement age and have worked enough in
recent years.2 In addition, the worker must pass the screening for "total disability,"
which the Social Security Administration defines as the inability to work due to
'I thank David Autor for his detailed feedback on this project. I also appreciate helpful com-
ments from Leila Agha, Peter Diamond, JB Doyle, Amy Finkelstein, Jon Gruber, Jon Skinner, and
numerous seminar participants at Colgate University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. I acknowledge support from the Kauffman Foundation. All errors are my own.
2The exact length and timing requirements for employment vary by person.
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medical conditions that are expected to result in death or to last for at least one
year. Since the program intends to cover workers with long-term disabilities, few
beneficiaries exit voluntarily by becoming employed again. The two main reasons
for leaving SSDI are reaching the full retirement age3 and death, which together
account for 86% of the exits in 2004 (Autor and Duggan, 2006).
Because receiving disability benefits is almost an absorbing state, mistakenly
accepting work-capable individuals into disability insurance could generate ad-
ditional financial burdens to taxpayers, as well as productivity losses to society.
The current SSDI application review process is likely imperfect since it is based on
a mixture of objective and subjective criteria intended to evaluate an applicant's
medical impairments and ability to work. Certain medical conditions, such as back
pain and depression, are difficult to verify, making the award decision more sus-
ceptible to personal judgment. Maestas et al. (2011) show that disability examiners
vary in their stringency and, as a result, applicants with similar characteristics may
receive benefits under some examiners but get rejected by others.
Previous empirical studies show that an imperfectly screened disability in-
surance can discourage work in two ways. First, receiving disability benefits may
cause work-capable recipients to stay away from the labor force (Chen and van der
Klaauw, 2008; Maestas et al., 2011; von Wachter et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2012).
Second, the presence of an imperfectly screened disability insurance program may
induce work-capable individuals to drop out of the labor force to apply for disabil-
ity insurance, especially when they face adverse labor market conditions (Gruber
and Kubik, 1997; Gruber, 2000; Autor and Duggan, 2003; Autor et al., 2012). This
paper considers a dynamic type of work disincentive effect that has not been ex-
plored in the empirical literature. Under a disability insurance program with im-
3The disability benefits become retirement benefits at the full retirement age.
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perfect screening, individuals with a sufficiently high work disutility may plan to
drop out of the labor force in the future and apply for disability insurance, regard-
less of their future health status. As a result, the current literature focusing on the
contemporaneous impact of disability insurance on labor force participation may
underestimate the magnitude of the total work disincentive effect, since disability
insurance not only affects current labor supply but may also affect the labor sup-
ply in the future. I develop a modified two-period version of the model of Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2006) showing that it is utility maximizing for certain individuals
to plan for their future disability insurance application. Since they intend to retire
sooner, on average, these individuals choose to accumulate more assets than those
who would only apply for disability insurance if disabled.
I present empirical support for the model using the RAND Health and Re-
tirement Study (HRS) panel data. Using quantile regressions, I show that, con-
ditional on observed characteristics-including income, labor force participation,
and health status-rejected applicants have more liquid assets than accepted ap-
plicants at the time of their disability insurance application. The effect is increasing
in applicants' asset levels and statistically significant for the 50% to 80% quantiles.
Furthermore, rejected and accepted applicants have similar levels of liquid assets
in the several years before their application, suggesting that the divergence at the
time of the disability insurance application is unlikely to have been driven by any
unobserved differences in the applicants' inherent tendency to save. Consistent
with the model, I also find evidence that the rejected applicants display signifi-
cantly lower attachment to the labor force prior to their application, implying that
they may have a lower desire to work than the accepted applicants. Although re-
jected and accepted applicants are similar in their self-reported levels of health at
the time of application, accepted applicants are significantly less healthy than re-
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jected applicants in the few years after application. Taken together, these results
suggest that some rejected applicants have accumulated their assets in a way that
is consistent with the planning story. However, the current screening system is suf-
ficiently effective at detecting at least some of these work-capable applicants, even
without relying on assets as a criterion.4 Thus, it is unclear whether imposing an
asset-based criterion on top of the current system, as suggested by Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006), would increase the efficacy of screening.
By comparing the rejected and accepted applicants, my methodology follows
the literature that attempts to identify the causal impact of receiving disability ben-
efits on future labor force participation. One of the earliest studies taking this ap-
proach is that of Bound (1989), who argues that since the rejected applicants are
on average healthier, their post-application labor force participation should serve
as an upper bound for the counterfactual labor force participation of the accepted
applicants. Although the author finds a low labor force participation rate among
the rejected applicants in his sample, his methodology is criticized for not care-
fully controlling for the differences between the rejected and accepted applicants.
Follow-up studies improve upon Bound's work by either conditioning on observ-
ables (von Wachter et al., 2011) or exploring features of SSDI that generate different
award decisions to otherwise similar applicants (Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008;
Maestas et al., 2011).5 In contrast to this literature, I explore the differences between
the rejected and accepted applicants rather than assuming the two groups are sim-
ilar or constructing a comparable sample. Giertz and Kubik (2011) use a similar
approach, also with the HRS data, to compare the labor force participation of re-
4At the same time, it is not effective enough to deter their applications.5These studies provide evidence that receiving SSDI benefits has a negative impact on benefi-
ciaries' tendency to return to work. For instance, Maestas et al. (2011) show that applicants who
receive SSDI benefits due to being randomly assigned to more lenient disability examiners are sig-
nificantly less likely to work than those whose applications were rejected by stricter examiners.
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jected and accepted applicants. However, they do not study asset accumulation or
test a model similar to mine.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the con-
ceptual framework and its link to empirical analysis. Section 3.3 discusses the
RAND HRS data and my sample construction. Section 3.4 presents the empirical
strategies and results. Section 3.5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Following the framework in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006), I develop a two-period model to illustrate how agents simultane-
ously determine their asset accumulation and future labor force participation. The
goal of the model is to show that under an imperfectly screened disability insur-
ance program, it could be optimal for agents to plan for their exit out of the labor
force in the future and apply for disability insurance regardless of whether they
will be truly disabled.
3.2.1 Assumptions
The model has two periods. In the first period, all agents are able. In the
second period, each agent faces a probability of being disabled, that is, unable to
work. Thus, the only source of uncertainty in this model is the disability status in
the second period. If working in either period, the agent will supply one unit of
labor inelastically and receive wage w, which is assumed to be uniform across in-
dividuals. All agents start with zero assets in the first period. Let # be the discount
rate and R be the interest rate. To simplify the math, without loss of generality, I
assume that #3R = 1.
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I allow the agents to differ on two parameters: OB, the probability of being
totally disabled in the second period, and xi, the disutility of work in each period.
An agent derives utility u (ci) - xi in a period if working and u (ci) if not, where ci
is consumption. Following the standard assumptions, u (-) is increasing, concave,
and u (0) = -o. By distinguishing the disutility of work from the probability of
total disability, I conceptually separate being unwilling to work from being unable to
work. Empirically, the former is an unobserved preference, whereas the latter can
be partially observed based on health. However, from the perspective of designing
optimal disability insurance, some argue that it is unnecessary to separate the two
(Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995).
3.2.2 Utility Maximization without Disability Insurance
As a starting point, I assume there is no disability insurance. Let ki be individ-
ual i's asset accumulated by the end of the first period. Thus, if the agent becomes
disabled in the second period or chooses not to work, she consumes Rki. If the
agent works, she consumes Rki + w. The agent's utility maximization problem is
as follows:
V = maxu (w - ki) + #V2 (ki) , where
ki
V2 (ki) =max {6u (Rki) + (1 - O) (u (w + Rki) - Xi) , u (Rki)}
u (Rki) if u(w + Rki) -u(Rki) < xi;
O6u (Rki) + (1 - 0,) (u (w + Rki) - xi) otherwise.
Since everyone works in the first period, xi drops out of the problem in the
first period. The choice parameter ki affects the incentive compatibility constraint
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in the second period. Thus, workers simultaneously decide in the first period how
much to save and whether to work (if able) in the second period. Time consistency
requires that a worker who decides not to work in the second period will not work
in the second period, regardless of disability realization.
Proposition 3.2.1. Given 6, there exists a cutoff J such that, for all xi < J, the agent will
work in the second period if able ("working path") and save ki = ka and,for all xi > ;, the
agent will not work in the second period ("non-working path") and save k - k, where ka
and k3 solve the following first-order conditions, respectively:
n'(w - k") = Ou' (Rk") + (1 - 0) (u'(w + Rk")) (3.1)
and u' (w - k) = U' (Rk). (3.2)
Proof. See Section 3.7.1 in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2.2. k < kV.
Proof. We have
u'(w - k) -u'(Rk") = (1 -0)(u'(w + Rk") -u'(Rk)) < 0,
u' (w - k) -u' (RkV) = 0.
Since u" (.) < 0,u' (w - k) - u' (Rk) is increasing in k. Thus,u' (w - k") - u'(Rk") <
u' (w - k) - u' (Rk) implies that k < k. l
Propositions 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 suggest that, conditional on the probability of be-
ing disabled in the second period, agents with a sufficiently high disutility of work
will decide not to work in the future, regardless of their disability realization, even
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in the absence of a disability insurance system. Since the expected income is zero
in the second period, these agents would save more than those who decide to work
in the second period.
3.2.3 Utility Maximization with Disability Insurance
I now introduce disability insurance into the model but start with the simple
case with no screening. The disability insurance program exists in the second pe-
riod through imposing a labor tax (T) on the working population and transferring
benefits (T) to the recipients. Since there is no screening, anyone who applies for
the insurance is accepted. An agent receiving disability insurance cannot work.
The parameters (r, T) are chosen such that total transfers equal total tax payments;
there is no need to explicitly specify the rules here.
Given (6, x) and k, the utility in the second period becomes
(1 - 9) [u (w (1 - T) + Rk) - x] + Ou (Rk + T)
for the working path and u (Rk + T) for the non-working path. Following the
same derivation as in Section 3.2.2, one can show that there are two levels of assets
for each of the working and non-working paths and workers with a disutility of
work lower than a certain cutoff ' would choose the working path. The disability
transfer makes the non-working path more attractive than before and the labor tax
makes the working path less attractive. Thus, the new cutoff F' is lower than the
original cutoff Y. In other words, given 6, people with x slightly below the original
cutoff z now have the incentive to switch to not working in the second period and
become disability recipients regardless of disability realization.
For agents choosing the non-working path, the expected income in the second
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period is positive and thus their new optimal level of asset would be lower than
k in Equation (3.2). However, since w (1 - T) > T,6 their expected income in the
second period is still lower than that for agents who choose the working path. As
a result, agents choosing the non-working path still accumulate more assets than
those choosing the working path.
3.2.4 Utility Maximization with Imperfectly Screened Disability
Insurance
While previous studies such as that of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) do not
explicitly include screening in similar models, screening could affect both the la-
bor force participation and asset accumulation of potential disability applicants.
To see this, suppose the program makes both Type I and Type II errors and let p be
the probability that the disability insurance program accepts an able worker and q
be the probability that it rejects a disabled worker. Furthermore, I assume that a re-
jected applicant earns zero income in the second period. This is consistent with the
empirical observation that to qualify for disability insurance, an applicant needs to
be out of the labor force for a sufficiently long period (five months) before applying
for disability as well as during the entire time of the application, which can take
up to several years. As a result, a rejected disability insurance applicant may have
a difficult time getting back into the labor force afterward (Parsons, 1991).
Given (0, x) and k, the utility in the second period for the working path is
(1 - 0) [u (w (1 - -) + Rk) - x] + 6(1 - q) u (Rk + T) + Oqu (Rk)
60therwise there would be no incentive to work.
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and the utility in the second period for the non-working path is
[0(1 - q) +(1 - 6)pu(Rk +T) +[(1 - 9) (1 -p) +6q]u(Rk).
As long as p is strictly positive, able agents who have chosen the non-working
path would always apply for disability insurance in the second period. Because of
screening, the non-working path becomes less attractive than in Section 3.2.3 but it
is still better than the case with no disability insurance in Section 3.2.2. Thus, given
9, the threshold for the disutility of work between agents choosing the working
path and those choosing the non-working path, z-*, is between Y and F. The same
intuition holds that the optimal level of asset accumulation in the non-working
path is higher than for the working path, since an agent's expected income in the
former path in the second period is lower.
3.2.5 Asset Accumulation of Rejected and Accepted Applicants
In the second period, able agents who have chosen the working path would
always work in the second period and not apply for disability insurance. The dis-
ability applicant pool consists of three groups: disabled agents who have chosen
the working path, disabled agents who have chosen the non-working path, and
able agents who have chosen the non-working path. Because of imperfect screen-
ing, both rejected and accepted applicants include a mixture of all three groups.
Proposition 3.2.3. E (kI1, rejected) - E (k10, accepted) > 0 if and only if 1 - p > q.
Proof. See Section 3.7.2 in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2.3 shows that the expected assets of a rejected applicant are
higher than those of an accepted applicant as long as screening is sufficiently ef-
fective so that an able agent is more likely to be rejected than a disabled agent.
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Furthermore, the rth quantile of the asset of an accepted applicant is
Qk (T|0, accepted)
k"Cf* for T < 6(1-q)FO(z*) 
_k(1-q)+p(1--o)(1-Fo(hr*)) i
k,* otherwise.
And the rth quantile of the asset of a rejected applicant is
Qk (T 0, rejected)
k* for T < 6qFe(z*) 72'
=q+(1-p)(1-0)(1-F(z*)) -
k* otherwise.
Thus, the difference between the two is
k8* - ka*
Qk (T|0, rejected) - Qk (T|0, accepted) =
0
for T2 < T < -i;
otherwise.
Note that T - T 2 = 6 (1 - 0) (1 - F6 (J*)) Fo (z*) (1 - q - p) > 0 if and only if
1 - p > q. Thus, rejected and accepted applicants have similar assets at the lowest
and highest quantiles, but rejected applicants have higher assets in between the
two extremes.
3.2.6 Identification
The theoretical model implies that, conditional on observing wage and health,
the level of assets at the time of SSDI application is indicative of whether one has
chosen a working path or a non-working path. However, empirically linking the
observed asset level to a certain path is extremely challenging, if not impossible.
Not only are there many more factors that affect individuals' asset accumulation,
but also the observations of wage and health are imperfect. Thus, in order to test
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(3.3)
whether certain SSDI applicants planned for their application, I rely on the obser-
vation that the current SSDI system does not use an asset test and the identifying
assumption that the screening rejects some of the work-capable applicants who
have taken the non-working path.' As long as rejected applicants have a higher
proportion of individuals who have chosen the non-working path, I expect them
to have a higher level of assets than accepted applicants at the time of SSDI applica-
tion, both in expected value and at certain quantiles. To control for any unobserved
differences in individuals' tendency to save, I also compare their asset levels in the
years leading up to their application. Since it is less likely that individuals start
planning for the SSDI application well in advance, I do not expect to find much
difference in their asset levels several years before the application.
Since rejected applicants are expected to be healthier, if they were all to take
the working path, their asset levels would have been lower than the accepted ap-
plicants', controlling for wages. This is because healthier agents have a higher ex-
pected income if they decide to work. Thus, any unobserved differences in health
should bias against finding any effect.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 The RAND HRS Data
To compare rejected and accepted applicants at the time of application, the
data for my empirical analysis require observing the timing and outcome of dis-
ability application, as well as the path of asset accumulation. The publicly available
data that best satisfy these requirements are the RAND HRS panel data. A clean,
compiled version of the original HRS, the data follow five cohorts of individuals
7At the same time, screening is also imperfect, so that these applicants have the incentive to
apply
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born between 1931 and 1953, with observations every two years since 1992.8 In
addition to disability insurance application and wealth, the data also provide in-
formation on demographics, health, employment, retirement, and income. RAND
(2011) provides the details on the construction of the RAND HRS panel data.
3.3.2 Sample Construction
I use two criteria to select my sample of disability insurance applicants:
" An individual must having applied for SSDI but not Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) between ages 44 and 65.9
" An individual must have non-missing asset data between the year of SSDI
application and three years prior. Since the HRS survey takes place in even
years, I observe SSDI applicants either zero and two years before application
or one and three years before application. Thus, I define the time of the SSDI
application to be zero or one year before the application and use observations
in the two and three years before the application as controls.
The resulting sample includes 172 rejected SSDI applicants and 422 accepted ap-
plicants who applied for disability benefits between 1994 and 2010. The ratio of
rejected to accepted applicants is similar for those who applied in odd years and
for those who applied in even years. The overall acceptance rate is around 71%,
which is comparable to other studies that use the HRS to study SSDI and SSI ap-
plicants (Benitez-Silva et al., 1999, 2004; Giertz and Kubik, 2011) as well as the 1%
Files of Social Security administrative data used by von Wachter et al. (2011). It is
8There is a sixth cohort, the "Mid Baby Boomer" cohort, which was first interviewed in 2010.
However, data on the sixth cohort are not available yet.
9SS1 imposes a limit on "countable resources" such as cash and bank accounts. As of 2012, the
limit is $2000 for an individual and $3000 for a couple (SSA, 2012). Thus, I do not expect to find
significant differences among the asset levels of SSI applicants.
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higher, however, than the national acceptance rates between 1992 and 2009 (SSA,
2010), which are usually less than 60%.
3.4 Empirical Results
To establish that there is enough power to detect any significant difference, my
analysis needs to a) distinguish between rejected and accepted applicants based
on ex ante observable characteristics used in the SSDI evaluation (e.g., health) to
show that screening is sufficiently effective and b) distinguish between applicants
based on ex ante characteristics unobserved by SSDI but that might affect asset
accumulation (e.g., work disutility). Thus, I first present the results comparing the
mean characteristics of the rejected and accepted applicants. I then discuss the
regression analysis.
3.4.1 Mean Comparisons
Demographics and Labor Force Participation
Panel A in Table 3.1 compares the demographics of the rejected and accepted
applicants. It also reports the t-statistics from a two-sample T-test of equal means.
Overall, the two groups are similar. The only two variables that are significantly
different based on the T-test are birth year and household size at the time of SSDI
application. The rejected applicants are less likely to be male and white (at 38.4%
and 43.4%, respectively) and, on average, have slightly fewer years of education
(around 11.76 years). Although the rejected applicants are younger in the same
calendar year, their average age at the time of application is similar to that of the
accepted applicants. At the time of application, the rejected applicants are slightly
less likely to be married, but their household size is larger. The rejected applicants
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are more likely to live in the south and the west and less likely to live in the north-
east and midwest. The differences in their geographic distributions, however, are
not significant.
Similar to Giertz and Kubik (2011) and von Wachter et al. (2011), I find that
the rejected applicants show significantly less attachment to the labor force imme-
diately before their SSDI application. According to Panel B in Table 3.1, 40.1% of
the rejected applicants report that they were at least partially retired at the time
of application, compared to 34.6% among the accepted applicants. Only 40.7%
and 34.5% of the rejected applicants were in the labor force or working for pay,
respectively. In contrast, 59.7% and 54.3% of the accepted applicants were in the
labor force or working for pay. The differences in both variables are large and sta-
tistically significant. The rejected applicants are not only less likely to have been
working at the time of SSDI application, but also have worked for significantly
fewer years during the years that they were eligible to work (calculated as age mi-
nus the sum of six and years of education). The rejected applicants, on average,
had worked for 77.9% of the years that they were eligible to work, whereas the ac-
cepted applicants, on average, had worked for 84.3% of the years. Given that the
average number of eligible working years is around 40, the 5% difference is equiv-
alent to two years of employment. Conditional on being employed in the year of
SSDI application or the year before, the rejected applicants, on average, worked
five hours fewer per week, though both groups worked for a similar number of
weeks per year. Taken together, the results are consistent with two possibilities that
are not mutually exclusive: The rejected applicants face worse labor market condi-
tions and/or they have a higher disutility of work. Panel A shows that the rejected
and accepted applicants have similar education levels, demographics, and geo-
graphic distributions. Furthermore, both groups of applicants are similarly likely
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to have had blue collar jobs, such as construction workers, for the occupation with
the longest tenure. Thus, it is unlikely that adverse labor market conditions alone
could drive the stark difference in the applicants' attachment to the labor force,
both at the time of application and over their lifetime. Since preference is unob-
served, these results are suggestive but not definitive evidence that the rejected
applicants have, on average, a higher disutility of work.
Health before and after Application
Table 3.2 compares the health of the rejected and accepted applicants at the
time of their SSDI application (Panel A) and immediately after (Panel B), using
both subjective and objective measures. The subjective measures include self-
reported health and its first difference, as well as answers as to whether health
is limiting work and whether one is having back pain10 or feeling depressed. The
objective measures include whether one has stayed overnight in a hospital or vis-
ited a doctor in the past two years and out-of-pocket medical expenses. In the year
of SSDI application or the year before, the average health of the rejected applicants
appears slightly worse based on subjective measures, but better based on objective
measures. None of the differences, however, are statistically significant except for
whether health is limiting work. Around 69% of the rejected applicants reported
that their health was limiting them from working at the time of application, which
is around 10% more than the proportion among the accepted applicants.
However, one or two years after the SSDI application the rejected applicants
were significantly healthier by both subjective and objective measures. Compared
to the accepted applicants, the rejected applicants were significantly less likely to
report having fair or poor health or having stayed at a hospital or visited a doc-
10Whether one is having back pain is surveyed every other wave, so around 41% of the obser-
vations are missing.
154
tor in the last two years. They also spent less in out-of-pocket medical expenses
but the difference is not significant. Before and after the application, the average
self-reported health level stays fairly constant for the rejected applicants but deteri-
orates for the accepted applicants. In one or two years after the application, nearly
95% of the accepted applicants' reported that health was limiting them from work-
ing, now 5% more than for the rejected applicants, and the difference is statistically
significant. The only exception is that the rejected applicants were significantly
more likely to report having back pain. The two groups are also similar in their
likelihood of having depression. Since the application review process takes up to
several years, the results suggest that the SSA screening process distinguishes the
more healthy applicants from the less healthy ones at least by the time of the award
decision.
There are several possibilities why the rejected applicants appear to have
health similar to that of the accepted applicants at the time of application. The re-
jected applicants may underreport their health levels to the HRS at the time of SSDI
application, since they may feel obliged to justify their application or doubt the
confidentiality of the study (Benitez-Silva et al., 2004). Alternatively, some of re-
jected applicants may actually become healthier after the application, which leads
to their rejection. For the purpose of this study, it is not necessary to distinguish
between these hypotheses, since both suggest that the SSA's screening process is
effective at least to some degree.
Wealth and Income
Table 3.3 compares the wealth and income of the accepted and rejected appli-
cants at the time of application. My main measure of liquid assets is the level of
household non-housing financial assets. Since asset distribution is highly skewed
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(see Table A3.1 in the Appendix), I report both the mean and the median. Panel A
shows the comparison at the time of application, while Panel B reports the statis-
tics two or three years before the application. Overall, the accepted applicants have
higher personal earnings and total household income, which is consistent with the
observation that they work significantly more than the rejected applicants. Two
or three years before application, the accepted applicants have a higher median of
liquid assets, but the rejected applicants' median asset level surpasses that of the
accepted applicants at the time of application. Since many factors could affect the
level of liquid assets, I use regression analysis to formally estimate the differences
between the two groups, controlling for observables.
3.4.2 Regression Analysis
Since ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are sensitive to the inclusion
of outliers, my preferred specification uses quantile regressions to estimate the fol-
lowing equation:
Ait = a + #oRejectedi x T + +3 1Rejectedi x T2 + 3 1it + <b - Eit + E, (3.4)
where i denotes an applicant; t denotes a period; Ait is a household's liquid asset
level of person i in period t; "Rejected" is one if an applicant is ultimately rejected
and zero otherwise; Iit is the household's total income two years before t; and E
includes a set of controls, such as demographics, labor force participation, health,
out-of-pocket medical expenses, calendar year dummies, and years to application
dummies.
I estimate the effect of being a rejected applicant at the asset level separately
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for two time periods: zero or one year before the time of SSDI application and two
or three years before the application. I include only observations that are in these
two time periods to ensure a balanced panel.n Since the HRS survey is conducted
every other year, this means I have two observations for each applicant. Note that
0 and #1 are not the causal impact of SSDI rejection on asset accumulation but,
instead, represent the differences between the two groups, controlling for other
observables.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 3.4 report the estimates from quantile regressions
at the median and 25th and 75th percentiles, with standard errors bootstrapped
with 1000 repetitions. Controlling for income, the rejected applicants have around
$3300 more in median liquid assets than the accepted applicants at the time of SSDI
application and the results are robust to having different controls. The difference
is positive but not significant at the 25% quantile. However, at the 75% quantile,
the coefficient estimate is large and highly significant. In contrast, two or three
years before the application, the difference in the asset levels of the rejected and
accepted applicants is small and insignificant across all quantiles. Figure 3.1 plots
the coefficient estimates and the 90% confidence intervals from Equation (3.4). The
coefficient estimate is increasing in the applicants' asset level and is especially large
and significant after the 60% quantile. Two or three years before the application,
all the estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant. The OLS results in
Columns (5) and (6) also suggest that the rejected applicants accumulate more as-
sets prior to the application, but the estimates are highly sensitive to the inclusion
of controls.
Overall, the regression results suggest a significant difference in the asset lev-
els of the rejected and accepted applicants at the time of their SSDI application.
"Some of the applicants' asset information is missing for earlier periods, so including earlier
periods would result in an unbalanced panel.
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Such a difference does not appear in the two or three years before the application,
suggesting that it is unlikely to be driven by any inherent and unobserved dif-
ferences in the applicants' tendency to save. Since the observations of health and
income are not perfect, there are likely to be other unobserved factors that affect
assets. For instance, the rejected applicants could be healthier and expect a higher
probability of rejection from the SSDI program. However, in the absence of the
non-working path, these differences should lead to the rejected applicants hav-
ing a lower level of assets controlling for their income, in theory, since they have a
higher probability of returning to work and earning income. Thus, both the regres-
sion results and the mean comparisons are consistent with the predictions that the
rejected applicants are more likely to have planned their exit from the labor force
as a result of having a higher disutility of work.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper develops and empirically tests a model that predicts the asset ac-
cumulation and labor force participation of SSDI applicants. An applicant with a
high disutility of work plans to apply for disability insurance in the future, regard-
less of whether or not the applicant becomes disabled. A person with such a plan
would have more assets at the time of her disability application than if she had
planned to only apply when truly disabled. Using the RAND HRS data, I find that
rejected applicants are significantly healthier shortly after their application and
display significantly lower labor force attachment prior to their application. This
suggests that rejected applicants are more likely to be work-capable individuals
with a high disutility of work, but the SSDI screening is effective enough to de-
tect them. Consistent with the theory's predictions, my quantile regressions show
that rejected applicants have more liquid assets at the time of their applications
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and the difference is especially large for applicants in higher asset quantiles. These
findings are unlikely to be driven by any unobserved differences in preferences or
health.
My results suggest that there is an additional channel through which SSDI
discourages labor force participation. In particular, it encourages people to plan
for their future exit from the labor force. Without accounting for the intertemporal
effect of disability insurance on the future labor supply, the current literature fo-
cusing on the contemporaneous relation likely underestimates the associated pro-
ductivity losses. Not only does disability insurance function as long-term unem-
ployment insurance for individuals facing adverse labor market conditions (Autor
and Duggan, 2003,2006), but it is also possible that individuals with a high disutil-
ity of work consider SSDI to be a form of early retirement insurance. However, this
paper does not directly calibrate the degree of the dynamic work disincentive ef-
fect. Given the suggestive evidence of rejected applicants' high disutility of work,
it is unclear what proportion of them would have stayed in the labor force longer
in the absence of a disability insurance program. Understanding the magnitude of
the dynamic work disincentive effect is a promising direction for future research.
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Table 3.1: Mean Characteristics of Rejected and Accepted SSDI Applicants at the
Time of Application
Rejected Accepted -t-
(N=172) (N=422)
Panel A: Demographics
Male 0.384 0.434 1.12
White 0.709 0.749 0.99
Years of education 11.759 11.953 0.73
Year of birth 1943.95 1942.52 2.80***
Age at application 58.180 58.438 0.77
Married 0.692 0.723 0.75
Household size 2.692 2.465 1.90*
Northeast 0.116 0.166 1.53
Midwest 0.238 0.256 0.45
South 0.477 0.434 0.96
West 0.169 0.145 0.74
Panel B: Employment
Considers self partly/completely retired 0.401 0.346 1.25
In the labor force 0.407 0.597 4.28***
Currently working for pay 0.345 0.543 4.43***
Self-reported total years working 0.779 0.843 2.45**
Eligible working years
Hours worked per week if employed 33.828 38.284 2.42**
Weeks worked per year if employed 50.036 50.000 0.04
Blue collar occupations 0.352 0.364 0.27
Notes: This table reports the mean statistics of individual characteristics for the
rejected and accepted SSDI applicants in my sample. Here"-t-" is the t-statistic
from a two-sample t-test for equal means; the superscripts *, **, and *** indicate
p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively; Married, Household size, Northeast,
Midwest, South, West and variables in Panel B are determined the year of or one
year before the application; Eligible working years is calculated as (age - years of
education - 6); Blue collar occupations represents a blue collar job in the occupation
with the longest tenure.
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Table 3.2: Mean Health Status of Rejected and Accepted SSDI Applicants
Rejected Accepted -t-
(N=172) (N=422)
Panel A: 0 or 1 year before application
Self-reported health: fair or poor 0.587 0.559 0.62
Change in self-reported health 0.512 0.511 0.01
Health limiting work 0.691 0.598 2.10**
Has back pain 0.564 0.498 1.09
Has depression 0.329 0.280 1.17
Stayed at a hospital in the last 2 years 0.390 0.419 0.67
Visited a doctor in the last 2 years 0.959 0.976 1.11
Out-of-pocket medical expenses 3.535 4.358 0.99
Panel B: 1 or 2 years after application
Self-reported health: fair or poor 0.589 0.691 2.23**
Change in self-reported health 0.021 0.327 2.79***
Health limiting work 0.895 0.945 1.96*
Has back pain 0.650 0.533 1.79*
Has depression 0.292 0.294 0.05
Stayed at a hospital in the last 2 years 0.452 0.535 1.71*
Visited a doctor in the last 2 years 0.944 0.980 2.18*
Out-of-pocket medical expenses 6.323 9.480 0.60
Notes: This table reports the mean statistics of health-related variables for the re-
jected and accepted SSDI applicants in my sample. Here"-t-" is the t-statistic
from a two-sample t-test for equal means; the superscripts *, **, and *** indicate
p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively; Self-reported health: an integer between
one and five, with five being poor and one being excellent; Self-reported health: fair
or poor is 0/1 indicator variable for self-reported health being fair or poor; Change in
self-reported health: the first difference in self-reported health between the two sur-
vey years; and Out-of-pocket medical expenses is in thousands of real dollars, with
2000 being the base year.
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Table 3.3: Earnings and Assets of Rejected and Accepted SSDI Applicants
Rejected (N=172) Accepted (N=422)
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: 0 or 1 year before application
Household non-housing financial assets 34.085 2.138 28.000 1.085
Last year's personal earnings 15.878 3.145 21.174 15.378
Last year's household capital income 11.160 0.034 9.750 0.031
Last year's household total income 50.834 35.710 55.271 38.641
Panel B: 2 or 3 years before application
Household non-housing financial assets 59.047 2.018 44.690 2.840
Last year's personal earnings 22.797 12.723 24.380 19.794
Last year's household capital income 7.866 0.039 9.583 0.040
Last year's household total income 54.158 38.343 56.315 39.482
Notes: This table reports the mean and median statistics of the wealth-related vari-
ables for the rejected and accepted SSDI applicants in my sample. All variables are
in thousands of real dollars, with 2000 being the base year.
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Table 3.4: Panel Estimates of the Differences in Assets between Rejected and Ac-
cepted Applicants (Dep. Var. = Household Non-Housing Financial Assets)
Quantile OLS
(1) 50% (2) 50% (3) 25% (4) 75% (5) (6)
Rejected x 2.420** 3.314* 0.949 9.524*** 2.088 8.954
(0 or 1 yr before app.) (1.160) (1.925) (1.205) (3.314) (7.372) (10.852)
Rejected x 0.907 0.847 -0.015 -0.665 24.135** 15.826
(2 or 3 yrs before app.) (1.321) (1.406) (1.072) (4.378) (5.247) (7.072)
Household Income 0.293*** 0.331*** 0.086** 0.862*** 0.877** 0.857**
(0.052) (0.059) (0.035) (0.108) (0.195) (0.197)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
N 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188
Notes: This table reports the quantile and OLS regression estimates. The depen-
dent variable is the amount of household non-housing financial assets in thou-
sands of real dollars, with 2000 being the base year. Standard errors in the quantile
regressions are bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions. Standard errors in the OLS re-
gressions are robust and clustered by year of application. The superscripts *, **,
and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The controls include
variables for gender, age, white, and household size; geographic region dummies;
an indicator variable for being in the labor force; and indicator variable for self-
reported health being fair or poor; out-of-pocket medical expenses in the last two
years; survey year dummies; and years to application dummies.
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Figure 3.1: Quantile Estimates of Being a Rejected Applicant at the Level of Liquid Assets
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Notes: This figure plots the estimates and 90% confidence intervals of the quantile regression coefficients from Equation
(3.4) between the 20% and 80% quantiles. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions. The figure on the
left plots the coefficient estimates of being a rejected applicant interacted with it being zero or one year before the SSDI
application. The figure on the right plots the coefficient estimates of being a rejected applicant interacted with it being
two or three years before the SSDI application.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2.1
Proof. The agent solves the utility maximization in two steps. First, the agent de-
termines how many assets to accumulate based on whether he or she works in the
second period. Second, the agent compares the lifetime utility of each path and
picks that with the higher utility. If the agent works in the second period if able,
the solution ka must satisfy the following first-order condition:
u'(w-k") = 6u'(Rk")+(1-0)(u'(w+Rk"))
for xi <; u (w + Rk" ) -u (Rk").
Similarly, if the agent does not work in the second period regardless of dis-
ability realization, the solutions k must satisfy the following first-order condition:
u' (w - kV) = u' ( RVk)
for xi > u (w +Rk ) - u (Rk3 ).
Because the disutility of work and consumption enter the utility function sep-
arately, xi does not enter the first-order conditions. For now, I assume incentive
compatibility constraints hold. Thus an agent chooses the working path if and
only if
u (w - k") + 0 [Ou (Rk") + (1 -0) u(w + Rk")] - (u (w - k) + 3u (RkO))
Xi < f(1 -0)
(3.5)
The right-hand side of Equation (3.5) is the explicit expression for Y. To see
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that Y satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints, we have
Y - [u(w + Rk) -- u(Rk")]
u (w - k) + /u (Rk") - [u (w - k) + fu (RkV)]
/(1 -6) < 0,
since k maximizes u (w - k) + #u (Rk).
Similarly, since k" maximizes u (w - k"V) + / [6u (Rk" ) + (1 - 6) u (w + Rk" )],
x- [u (w+ RkV) -- u(RkV)] =
u (w - k") + / [Ou (Rk") + (1 - 6) u (w + Rk")]
0(1-6)
u (w - kV) + [6u (Rk) +(1
0(1-6)
-6)u (w + Rk)]
> 0.
D1
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2.3
Proof. Let Fo (x) be the conditional cumulative distribution function of x given 6.
Thus
- Fo (z*) is the proportion of agents taking the working path and accumulating
kQ*, while 1 - Fo (z*) is the proportion of agents taking the non-working path and
accumulating kO*,
- 6 + (1 - 6) (1 - Fo (z*)) is the proportion of SSDI applicants,
-6 (1 - q) + p (1 - 6) (1 - Fo (J-*)) is the proportion of accepted applicants, and
6q + (1 - p) (1 - 6) (1 - FO (z*)) is the proportion of rejected SSDI applicants.
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The expected assets accumulated by an accepted applicant are
E ( 10 aceped)=6 (1 - q) Fo (z,*) ka* + (6 (1 -q) + p (1 - 0)) (1 - Fo (*)kI'*E(k|,accepted)= 0 (1 -q)+p(1-6)(1--Fo(*))
and the expected assets accumulated by a rejected applicant are
E~kreected) = OqFo (;c) k"* + (q+(1 - p) (1 -0)) (1 -- F(z*))k*
,rj ) Oq + (1 - p) (1 - 6) (1 - Fo
Since k"* > kO*, this implies that
E (k|9, accepted) - E (k|O, rejected)
= 9(1 -6) (1 - Fo (*))FO (*) (ka* - kf*) (1 - q - p)
> 0 if and only if 1 -q-p> 0.
D
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3.7.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A3.1: Distribution of Household Non-Housing Financial Asset at the Time
of Application
Sample Rejected Accepted
Min. -50.652 -1500.369
25% 0 0
50% 2.135 1.085
75% 28.360 25.006
Max. 528 1338.773
Notes: This table reports the household non-housing financial asset (in thousands
of real dollars, with base year 2000) for the rejected and accepted applicants at the
0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% quantiles.
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